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Abstract 
We test the hypothesis that foreign direct investment promotes corporate governance 
spillovers in the host country. Using firm-level data from 64 countries during the period 
2005-2014, we find that cross-border M&A activity is associated with subsequent 
improvements in the governance of non-target firms when the acquirer country has 
stronger investor protection than the target country. The effect is more pronounced when 
the target industry is more competitive. Cross-border M&As are also associated with 
increases in investment and valuation of non-target firms. Alternative explanations such 
as access to global financial markets and cultural similarities do not appear to explain our 
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Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been an important element in financial globalization in 
recent decades. According to the World Development Indicators, the yearly average ratio of 
world FDI net inflows to gross domestic product (GDP) has increased nearly six times in the last 
decades from 0.5% in the 1980s to 3% between 2000 and 2014. More than half of FDI occurs 
through cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As). During the mid-2000s merger boom and 
again more recently in the 2010s, the value of cross-border deals exceeded the value of domestic 
M&As (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2007). 
FDI, and especially cross-border M&As, can be a source of corporate governance 
improvements in the host country. An active international market for corporate control may 
substitute for weak investor protection and legal institutions in a host country (Manne 1965; 
Scharfstein 1988). Research supports the idea that cross-border M&As bring corporate 
governance improvements to target firms. Rossi and Volpin (2004) find that firms based in weak 
legal environments are frequently targets of acquisition by firms located in strong legal 
environments. Bris and Cabolis (2008) and Martynova and Renneboog (2008) find that cross-
border M&As generate substantial valuation gains when the acquirer firm’s country has stronger 
investor protection than the target firm’s country. None of these papers, however, provides 
evidence of actual corporate governance improvements.   
We investigate whether the change in corporate control following a cross-border M&A leads 
to changes in corporate governance. The main hypothesis is that there is a positive governance 
spillover for non-target firms following a cross-border M&A when the acquirer firm is from a 
country with higher investor protection relative to the host country. We discuss several 
mechanisms that predict such spillovers, which share the intuition that cross-border M&As act as 
a coordinating device for other firms to also improve governance. Further, we hypothesize that 
cross-border M&As lead to increases in investment and valuation of non-target firms in line with 
the predicted governance spillovers. In our analysis, we focus on non-target firms because it is 
empirically difficult to measure the effects on target firms as these firms are frequently delisted 
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following the M&A.1  
To test these hypotheses, we use firm-level data on corporate governance and cross-border 
M&As in 64 target countries over 2005–2014, covering both emerging and developing nations. 
Although U.S. firms are included in the sample as acquirers, we exclude U.S. target firms in the 
main tests. 2  The main dependent variable is a firm-level governance index. We measure 
corporate governance using the percentage of 16 attributes on which the firm meets the minimum 
acceptable requirements (in terms of board, audit, antitakeover provisions, and compensation and 
ownership) drawn from the Bloomberg’s Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) 
database. The sample includes 6,691 unique non-U.S. firms, for a total of 33,498 firm-year 
observations for which we have data for the main variables of interest. While our index relies on 
fewer governance attributes than most international corporate governance studies, our sample is 
substantially larger and has greater cross-country and time-series variation. For example, 
Aggarwal et al. (2009) and Aggarwal et al. (2011) use an index that relies on 41 governance 
attributes from the RiskMetrics/Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), but the sample only 
includes 22 countries, all of which are developed countries, over 2004–2008. 
Our international setting allows us to consider substantially more differences in governance 
than what we can see in a single country such as the United States. While Aggarwal et al. (2011) 
study own-firm governance changes following cross-border portfolio investment flows, we study 
the spillover effects of FDI. Because foreign direct investors assume control of the target firm, 
they are more likely to enact governance changes in the target firm than foreign portfolio 
investors, and these changes can spillover to the local economy.  
Our main explanatory variable depends on who the relevant peer firms are with regards to the 
target firm. The mechanisms for governance spillovers that we consider suggest that we look at 
																																																								
1 We identify 233 targets in cross-border M&As in our sample. Of these targets, 28 are delisted in the same year, 
187 are delisted the following year, and only 18 remain in our sample for two years or more after the deal. 
2 We focus on non-U.S. target firms for three reasons: (1) U.S. firms typically have better corporate governance than 
otherwise similar non-U.S. firms (Aggarwal et al. 2009); (2) the results could be affected by the fact that there are 
many more U.S. firms than firms in any other country; and (3) we use domestic M&A activity in the United States 
as an instrumental variable. 
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non-target firms that operate in the same country and industry as the target firm. Our main 
explanatory variable measures the entry of foreign firms into a country/industry through cross-
border M&As, interacted with the difference in investor protection between the source country 
and host country. We measure the value of all cross-border M&As in the target firm’s industry as 
a fraction of market capitalization. In our regressions, we also control for the level of cross-
border M&As in order to control for the primary reasons that cause capital flows regardless of 
the differences in investor protection. We also control for covariates such as firm size, growth 
opportunities, leverage, tangibility, insider ownership, and institutional ownership as well as year 
and firm fixed-effects. 
We find that cross-border M&As from source countries with relatively stronger investor 
protection vis-à-vis the host country produce significant positive governance spillovers within 
the target firm’s industry. In contrast, the level of cross-border M&As by itself is statistically 
insignificant. The governance spillover effect due to cross-border M&A from a source country 
with stronger investor protection is economically significant if compared with the effects of other 
important governance determinants such as foreign institutional ownership. A one-standard- 
deviation change in cross-border M&A from a country with stronger investor protection vis-à-vis 
the host country results in a change in the governance index that represents 2.5% of the annual 
standard deviation in that index. In contrast, in Aggarwal et al. (2011), a one-standard-deviation 
change in foreign institutional ownership results in a change that represents 3% of the standard 
deviation in their governance index. Thus, our governance spillover effect is about the same size 
as the direct effect of foreign institutional ownership on governance. What is remarkable about 
the effect in our paper is that, as a spillover effect, it changes the governance of all the firms in 
the industry (excluding the direct effect on the target firm, which presumably could be much 
larger). These findings are consistent with the notion that cross-border M&As can promote good 
corporate governance practices in the host country.  
One specific mechanism that we hypothesize to lead to such spillovers is product market 
competition. Following Giroud and Mueller (2011), we hypothesize that firms in less 
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competitive industries may be subject to greater agency costs, which may persist even after the 
entry of a foreign competitor. We find significant differences in the degree of governance 
spillovers when the target firm faces tougher product market competition. A one-standard-
deviation change in cross-border M&A from a country with stronger investor protection vis-à-vis 
the host country and into a perfectly competitive industry results in a change in the governance 
index that represents 5.5% of the annual standard deviation in that index. Our governance 
spillover effect in competitive industries is almost double the size of the direct effect of foreign 
institutional ownership on governance in Aggarwal et al. (2011). 
It is possible that the industry spillover effects that we capture are in fact country spillover 
effects. While we do not find a statistically significant effect of country-wide cross-border 
M&As in the governance of non-target firms, we consider two prominent theories for country 
effects of cross-border M&As. First, Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2007) hypothesize that 
increased access to global financial markets for firms located in countries with low economic and 
financial development can lead to governance changes across the board. Taking cross-border 
M&A activity at the country level as shocks to the access to global financial markets, we find no 
evidence of governance spillovers when the target firm is located in a country with low GDP per 
capita or low stock market capitalization (as a percentage of GDP). 3  Second, Ahern, 
Daminelli, and Fracassi (2015) show that the volume of cross-border M&As is higher between 
countries with relatively similar cultures. We find no evidence of governance spillovers after 
cross-border M&As involving countries with relatively similar cultures. We conclude that the 
effect of cross-border M&As remains significant when we control for economic development, 
financial development, and culture variables. Other mechanisms such as the takeover market, the 
CEO labor market or technological efficiency also do not seem to explain our findings. 
Next, we test whether the governance spillovers produce real effects. We find that cross-
border M&A activity in an industry from a source country with relatively higher investor 
																																																								
3 It is, however, possible that our test of the Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2007) hypothesis lacks power by not having 
a large enough shock to global financial market access. 
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protection vis-à-vis the host country is associated with increases in investment of non-target 
firms in the target firm’s industry. We also find positive spillovers on the market valuation of 
non-target firms following cross-border M&As. This firm-level evidence is consistent with the 
industry-level evidence in Bris, Brisley, and Cabolis (2008). They find a positive relation 
between the industry Tobin’s Q and the average change in investor protection (difference 
between acquirer and target country investor protection) following cross-border M&As.  
We redo our empirical exercise using an instrumental variables estimator to address omitted 
variables and reverse causality issues simultaneously.4 We use the level of tariffs by industry in 
the host country, the level of import penetration in the host country/industry, and domestic M&A 
activity in the United States (since the sample does not include U.S. firms as targets) as sources 
of exogenous variation in cross-border M&As in each country and industry. These instruments 
are jointly significant in explaining cross-border M&As. The instrumental variable estimates 
suggest a causal effect from cross-border M&A (from source countries with relatively higher 
investor protection) to peer effects in corporate governance. 
Our work contributes to a literature that studies convergence of corporate governance 
practices around the world (see Denis and McConnell (2003) for a review of the literature on 
international corporate governance). Researchers have observed that home-country legal 
protection of minority investors is an important determinant of firm governance choices (Doidge, 
Karolyi, and Stulz 2007), but an increasing exposure to global markets can potentially change 
that. Gilson (2001) identifies three types of corporate governance convergence: (1) functional 
convergence, when firm-level governance responds to demands by market participants; (2) 
formal convergence, when there is a change in legislation that forces the adoption of better 
																																																								
4 Note that our exercise is not subject to the reflection problem (Manski 1993; Leary and Roberts 2014). The 
reflection problem is created when one tries to explain individual firm outcomes (e.g., firm leverage) using 
corresponding outcomes among a firm’s peers (e.g., peer leverage). An observed correlation between a given firm’s 
policies and the actions or characteristics of its peers can be attributed to an endogeneity bias  i.e., selection of 
firms or an omitted common factor. Our experiment overcomes this challenge by examining the correlation between 
non-target corporate governance and a potential source of exogenous variation in peer firm attributes (i.e., industry 




governance practices; and (3) contractual convergence, when firms commit themselves to better 
governance regimes such as through U.S. cross-listing (Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz 2004; Kumar 
and Ramchand 2008; Lel and Miller 2008). Our evidence demonstrates the importance of 
functional convergence as compared to formal convergence that are less frequent and sometimes 
not fully implemented (Khanna, Kogan, and Palepu 2006) and contractual convergence through 
cross-listings, which have declined in the last decade (Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz 2013). 
Our research is also related to papers that link product market competition and firm policy 
choices (e.g., Kovenock and Phillips 1997; MacKay and Phillips 2005) as well as papers that 
highlight the importance of peer firms in determining investment and financial policies (e.g., 
Dougal, Parsons, and Titman 2015; Leary and Roberts 2014). Consistent with our results, 
Servaes and Tamayo (2014) show that when a U.S. firm is targeted by a hostile takeover attempt 
its industry peers respond by cutting capital expenditures and cash holdings and increasing 
leverage and payout to shareholders. In addition, Harford, Stanfield, and Zhang (2016) find that 
leveraged buyout target rivals engage in governance improvements, and Gantchev, Gredil, and 
Jotikasthira (2014) find that peers of firms targeted by hedge fund activism improve operating 
performance in the same way as targets. These findings are consistent with the idea that the 
threat of takeover and shareholder activism can help reduce industry-wide agency problems, 
since they also affect the policies of industry peers. We extend these findings by providing direct 
evidence of industry-wide corporate governance changes through spillover effects and therefore 
evidence of functional convergence driven by the international market for corporate control.  
In addition, our research is linked to a literature that examines the determinants and valuation 
gains of cross-border M&As. Previous research highlights the role of differences in country-level 
investor protection (Rossi and Volpin 2004; Bris and Cabolis 2008; Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar 
2010), cultural proximity (Ahern, Daminelli, and Fracassi 2015), economic nationalism (Dinc 
and Erel 2012), foreign institutional investors (Ferreira, Massa, and Matos 2010), currency and 
stock market valuation (Erel, Liao, and Weisbach 2012), international taxation (Huizinga and 
Voget 2009), bank regulatory arbitrage (Karolyi and Taboada 2015), differences in takeover laws 
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(Lel and Miller 2015), differences in labor market regulations (Alimov 2015; Dessaint, Golubov, 
and Volpin 2017), and industry specialization (Frésard, Hege, and Phillips 2017). 
Finally, we contribute to the literature that studies the effects of FDI on the host country. FDI 
can be a source of valuable technology and know-how by promoting linkages with host country 
firms, which can generate improvements in productivity. Empirically, however, there is mixed 
evidence of productivity spillovers associated with FDI (e.g., Haddad and Harrison 1993; Aitken 
and Harrison 1999; Javorcik 2004; Haskel, Pereira, Slaughter 2007; Keller and Yeaple 2009; 
Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen 2012; Guadalupe, Kuzmina, and Thomas 2012; Abebe, 
McMillan, and Serafinelli 2017). If foreign firms become more productive at the expense of 
lower productivity in host country firms, FDI may actually have an adverse effect. We identify a 
new channel – corporate governance – through which FDI may generate productivity spillover 
effects at the industry level. 
1. Data 
The data source for firm-level governance is Bloomberg’s Environmental, Social and 
Governance (ESG). Our sample of governance attributes covers 64 countries over 2005–2014. 
We use 16 attributes (divided into four subcategories − board, audit, anti-takeover provisions, 
and compensation and ownership) to create a composite governance index, GOV, for each firm 
and year. These attributes are listed in Table A1 of Appendix A.5 The index measures the 
percentage of attributes in which the firm meets minimum acceptable requirements. If a firm 
satisfies all 16 governance attributes, its GOV is 100%. The evidence in Aggarwal et al. (2009) 
suggests that local minority shareholders benefit from governance improvements as measured by 
increases in governance indexes. They use an index that relies on 41 governance attributes from 
the RiskMetrics/Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), but their sample is limited in terms of 
																																																								
5 Bloomberg’s ESG contains 269 indicators that vary greatly in coverage. We selected the 16 in our index from 
those indicators with good coverage that are also most related to the attributes in the index used by Aggarwal et al. 
(2009). The overall correlation between the two indexes is 0.6. 
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the number of countries and years (22 developed countries over 2004–2008).     
The data source for cross-border M&As is SDC Platinum, and our sample of M&As covers 
the period from 2004 through 2013 (all explanatory variables are lagged by one year). We select 
all completed deals in which the acquirer seeks to own more than 50% of the target’s equity (i.e., 
the parent’s target is a public company) from countries for which firm-level governance data are 
available. By restricting our sample to control acquisitions, we focus on the most significant 
M&As, which are more likely to change the level of protection to the target firm’s investors. We 
exclude leveraged buyouts, spinoffs, recapitalizations, self-tenders, exchange offers, repurchases, 
minority stake purchases, acquisitions of remaining interest, and privatizations. Of the resulting 
deals, we keep only those deals with a transaction value of at least $1 million. This gives a 
sample of 9,995 cross-border deals with acquirers coming from 144 countries.  
The spillover mechanisms that we study can differ on which non-target firms are affected: 
industry peers or country peers. In the first case, we measure cross-border M&A activity (XVAL) 
as the annual value of all cross-border deals in the target firm’s country and industry (at the two-
digit SIC level) as a fraction of market capitalization. In the second case, we measure cross-
border M&A activity (XVALC) as the annual value of all cross-border deals in the target firm’s 
country as a fraction of market capitalization. We winsorize XVAL and XVALC at the bottom and 
top 1% levels. 
The final sample covers 6,691 unique firms for which firm-specific GOV and country-
industry-level XVAL are available.	 In 2014, these firms represent roughly 56% of the market 
capitalization of these countries.6 To focus purely on spillover effects in our tests, we exclude 
firms that were targets themselves in cross-border M&As in the current year. Target firms might 
have improved governance because they are a target themselves and not due to governance 
spillovers. Although U.S. firms are included in the sample as acquirers, we exclude U.S. target 
firms and corresponding spillover effects for their local peers.  
																																																								
6 The percent of market capitalization covered by the firms in our sample ranges from 11% in Peru to 80% in Japan. 
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Table 1 shows that, on average, the countries with the highest GOV are Canada (82.1%), 
Switzerland (80.8%), and the United Kingdom (76.7%). The countries with the lowest GOV are 
India (60.0%), Thailand (60.2%), and the Philippines (60.7%). Average cross-border M&A 
activity (XVAL) is highest in Peru (7.7%), Poland (5.2%), and Belgium (4.9%) and is lowest in 
China, Colombia, Indonesia, Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand (0%). Table 2 reports the top and 
bottom ten industries in terms of XVAL. There is considerable variation in cross-border M&A 
activity across industries. The “Trucking & Warehousing” industry has the highest average level 
of XVAL. The industries with the lowest average XVAL include “Food Stores” and “Heavy 
Construction, Except Building.” 
We use the revised anti-director rights index of protections for minority shareholders from 
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) to build a measure of investor 
protection. For each cross-border M&A, the difference between acquirer and target country 
investor protection is denoted by IP, a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the value of 
transactions-weighted average difference between the acquirer and target anti-director rights 
index in a given country-industry (at the two-digit SIC level) is positive.7 We construct a similar 
measure of differences in investor protection for each country (IPC). Our regressions include 
XVAL and XVAL  IP as explanatory variables.  
We control for the intensity of domestic M&As activity (DVAL) as the annual value of all 
domestic deals in the target firm’s country and industry (at the two-digit SIC level) as a fraction 
of market capitalization. DVAL is included because an active domestic market for corporate 
control could influence the governance of the target’s peers (Servaes and Tamayo 2014). We 
construct a similar measure of domestic M&As activity (DVALC) for each country. 
We obtain firm characteristics from the WRDS-FactSet Fundamentals Annual Fiscal (North 
America and International) database. We use several firm-specific control variables in our 
regressions: logarithm of total assets in U.S. dollars (ASSETS), debt to assets ratio (LEVERAGE), 
																																																								
7 Table IA.1 in the Internet Appendix reports summary statistics of IP by country. 
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cash holdings to assets ratio (CASH), capital expenditure to assets ratio (CAPEX), property, 
plant, and equipment to assets ratio (PPE), return on assets (ROA), equity market-to-book ratio 
(MB), two-year annual sales growth in U.S. dollars (SGROWTH), research and development 
expenditures to assets ratio (R&D), foreign sales to total sales ratio (FXSALES), number of 
analysts following a firm (ANALYST), dummy variable that takes a value of one if a firm is 
cross-listed on a U.S. exchange (ADR), percentage of shares closely held (CLOSE), and sum of 
the holdings of institutions in a firm’s shares divided by market capitalization (IO_TOTAL). 
Firm-level controls that are defined as ratios are winsorized at the bottom and top 1% levels. 
Table A2 in Appendix A provides variable definitions and data sources. Table 3 provides 
summary statistics of the variables.  
To test for the mechanism that leads to governance spillovers, we measure product market 
competition at the industry level (at the two-digit SIC level) using the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index (HHI) based on annual sales for each industry and year in the United States. We use the 
HHI based on the United States because in many countries publicly-listed firms are a poor 
representation of the universe of firms.8 	
We also consider other mechanisms using country-level measures of economic development 
(GDP_PC, a dummy variable that equals one if the value of transactions-weighted average of 
the differences between acquirer country and target country GDP per capital is positive), and 
financial development (MKT_GDP, a dummy variable that equals one if the value of 
transactions-weighted average of the differences between acquirer and target country market 
capitalization to GDP is positive) as suggested by Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2007); cultural 
differences (value of transactions-weighted average) between acquirer and target country in 
																																																								
8 Tables IA.1 and IA.2 in the Internet Appendix report summary statistics of HHI at the country level and industry 
level, respectively. Some industries have maximum HHI of one, but they are unlikely to be outliers. The reason is 
that in the industries where the maximum HHI is one, the mean HHI is also high. These industries are “Agricultural 
Production - Livestock” (SIC 2) with mean HHI of 0.53, “Fishing, Hunting & Trapping” (SIC 9) with mean HHI of 
0.94, “Local & Interurban Passenger Transit” (SIC 41) with mean HHI of 0.78, “Legal Services” (SIC 81) with 
mean HHI of 0.82, and “Services, Not Elsewhere Classified” (SIC 89) with mean HHI of 0.86. In addition, we find 
similar results when we repeat our main tests using the HHI variable winsorized at the top 1%. 
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terms of trust (TRUST), hierarchy (HIERAR), and individualism (INDIV) as in Ahern, 
Daminelli, and Fracassi (2015);9 differences in domestic M&A activity (as a fraction of market 
capitalization) between acquirer and target country (DVALC) to capture the variation due to 
differences in domestic markets for corporate control; differences in CEO labor market between 
acquirer and target country as measured by CEO total compensation (COMP); and differences 
in total factor productivity between acquirer and target country (TFP). 
2. Corporate Governance Spillovers of Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions 
We examine the relation between the non-target firm’s governance index and the intensity of 
cross-border M&A activity. We start with an analysis of spillovers to the governance of the 
target firm’s local rivals. We run a baseline regression using a firm-year panel: 
ܩܱ ௜ܸ,௧ ൌ ߙܸܺܣܮ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߛ∆ܫ ௜ܲ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚܸܺܣܮ௜,௧ିଵ ൈ ∆ܫ ௜ܲ,௧ିଵ ൅Γܼ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߤ௜ ൅ ߣ௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧,     (1) 
where GOVi,t is the corporate governance index for firm i in year t; XVALi,t-1 is the value of 
cross-border M&As in firm i’s country-industry as a percentage of market capitalization in year 
t-1; IPi,t-1 is dummy variable that takes a value of one if the average difference between the 
acquirer and target anti-director rights index in a given country-industry is positive; and XVALi,t-1 
 IPi,t-1 is the value of cross-border M&As originating in countries with better investor 
protection than that in the host country. We expect that XVALi,t-1 summarizes how cross-border 
M&A affects corporate governance generally, while the interaction XVALi,t-1  IPi,t-1 captures 
how differences in investor protection shape the effect of cross-border M&A on corporate 
governance.	 The regression equation (1) includes firm-level controls (Zi,t1), a firm fixed-effect 
(µi) to control for time-invariant firm characteristics, and a year fixed-effect (t) to control for 
changes in governance affecting many countries simultaneously (e.g., adoption of IFRS by 
European firms in 2005). All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. We correct standard 
																																																								
9 Ahern, Daminelli, and Fracassi’s (2015) measures, which come from WVS-World Values Survey, are available 
only until 2008. For the 2009-2014 period, we use the 2008 values given that these variables are slow moving.  
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errors for clustering of observations at the firm level (i.e., we assume observations are 
independent across firms, but not within firms).  
The governance spillover effects that we consider may operate through product market 
competition. Following Giroud and Mueller (2011), we hypothesize that the positive spillover to 
the governance of the target’s local rival firms after a cross-border M&A is more pronounced in 
more competitive industries (e.g., managerial shirking would be more severely restricted after 
the cross-border M&A for the target and non-target firms). Firms in less competitive industries 
may be subject to greater agency costs and these may be perpetuated even after the entry of a 
foreign competitor.10 Thus, the relevant peers are the target firm’s country-industry rivals.  
Table 4 reports the estimates. Column (1) for estimates without XVAL shows that the control 
variables have the expected signs. Corporate governance is positively associated with 
institutional ownership (IO_TOTAL), which is consistent with the idea that institutional 
ownership is associated with better corporate governance. While it is important to control for 
these ownership links, our focus in this study is to identify the governance spillover effects of 
cross-border M&As when foreign investors assume control of target firms. Column (2) considers 
the effect of cross-border M&A activity in an industry on the governance of non-target firms 
operating in the same industry. We find a positive but insignificant effect of XVAL on non-target 
firms’ governance.  
The international market for corporate control should have a stronger effect if the acquirer 
country has better investor protection than the host country. To test this hypothesis, the 
regression in Column (3) includes the interaction XVAL  IP (as well as XVAL). We find that 
the XVAL  IP coefficient is positive and significant at the 1% level and that the XVAL 
coefficient is statistically insignificant.11 These results suggest that governance spillovers do not 
																																																								
10 A previous version of this paper formalized this argument based on a simple model à la Shleifer and Wolfenzon 
(2002) and Albuquerque and Wang (2008). 
11  We obtain similar estimates when we measure total cross-border M&A activity over the last three years, 
normalized by lagged market capitalization of the industry, to account for delays in the implementation of 
governance changes.  
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occur from cross-border deals in general but are concentrated in those deals in which the acquirer 
firm comes from a country with stronger investor protection than that of the target firm. The 
estimates in Column (3) imply that in deals in which the acquirer country has better investor 
protection than the target, a one-standard-deviation increase in XVAL is associated with a rise in 
non-target firms’ governance index of 0.23 percentage points [= (-0.0189 + 0.0857)  0.035], 
which represents 2.5% (= 0.0023 / 0.094) of the standard deviation in GOV. The governance 
spillover effects caused by cross-border M&As from a country with stronger investor protection 
are economically significant if compared with the direct effects of other important governance 
determinants such as foreign institutional ownership. In Aggarwal et al. (2011), a one-standard-
deviation increase in foreign institutional ownership (IO_FOR) is associated with an increase of 
about 3% of the standard deviation in their governance index. Thus, our governance spillover 
effect is about as large as the direct effect of foreign institutional ownership on governance.12 
Columns (4) and (5) test the product market competition mechanism by adding a measure of 
industry concentration, the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), and the interaction with both 
XVAL and XVAL  IP. Column (4) shows that the XVAL  HHI coefficient is negative but 
insignificant. Column (5) presents estimates of a regression that includes the interactions of 
XVAL with the difference in investor protection indicator (XVAL  IP) and with industry 
concentration (XVAL  HHI), as well as the triple interaction (XVAL  IP  HHI). The 
interaction XVAL  IP coefficient is 0.1672 and statistically significant, which suggests that 
there is a governance spillover in perfectly competitive industries when the acquirer country 
investor protection is better than that of the target country. In this case, a one-standard-deviation 
increase in XVAL is associated with a 0.51 percentage points [= (-0.0202 + 0.1672)  0.035] 
improvement in governance of non-target firms that operate in the same industry as the target 
firm. The effect is more than two times stronger than that in Column (3) where we do not control 
																																																								
12 The firm fixed effects estimate of the effect of foreign institutional ownership on governance in Aggarwal et al. 
(2011) of 0.023 multiplied by a one-standard-deviation change in foreign institutional ownership (0.15) results in a 
change that represents 3% of the standard deviation in their governance index (0.108). 
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for product market competition, and represents 5.5% (= 0.0051 / 0.094) of the standard deviation 
in GOV. This governance spillover effect is economically significant and is almost twice the 
magnitude of the direct effect of foreign institutional ownership on governance documented in 
Aggarwal et al. (2011). The governance spillover effect is significantly lower in less competitive 
industries as indicated by the negative and significant coefficient on XVAL  IP  HHI.  
We conclude that the evidence is consistent with the product market competition mechanism, 
as the governance spillover effect is greatest when the target operates in a competitive industry 
and the acquirer comes from a country with stronger investor protection than that of the target. 
3. Additional Mechanisms 
Next, we consider additional mechanisms that may explain the observed governance 
spillovers using the regression equation (1). The regressions include the country-level measure of 
domestic M&As activity (DVALC) and the same firm-level control variables as in Table 4.  
3.1 Country-wide governance spillovers 
We investigate whether the spillover effects that we find are truly at the industry level or 
rather at the country level. In panel A of Table 5, we investigate whether country-level cross-
border M&A activity from source countries with better investor protection than the host country 
leads to firm-level governance improvements in non-target firms in the host country. The 
regressions use country-level measures of cross-border M&A activity (XVALC) and investor 
protection differences between acquirer and target country (IPC).   
Columns (1) and (2) show that the country-level measures of cross-border M&As and 
investor protection differences, and their interaction, are statistically insignificant. In particular, 
the effect of XVALC is insignificant when the acquirer country investor protection is better than 
that of the target country.  
Columns (3) and (4) test the product market competition mechanism by adding a measure of 
industry concentration, the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), and the interaction with both 
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XVALC and XVALC  IPC. We find that the effect of XVALC is insignificant in perfectly 
competitive industries when the acquirer country investor protection is better than that of the 
target country. The overall country-level effect of cross-border M&As from a source country 
with stronger investor protection vis-à-vis the host country (evaluated at the median HHI of 
0.076) is statistically insignificant (the coefficient is -0.453 with a p-value of 0.328). The effect 
is significantly lower in less competitive industries as indicated by the negative and significant 
coefficient on XVALC  IPC  HHI.   
Our main explanatory variable XVAL  IP remains statistically significant in all 
specifications despite the strong correlation between XVAL and XVALC. The estimates in 
Column (4) imply that the overall effect of cross-border M&As (at the industry level) from a 
country with stronger investor protection vis-à-vis the host country (XVAL + XVAL  IP) is 
0.082 with a p-value of 0.007. These results suggest that governance spillovers seem to occur at 
the industry level, rather than at the country level.  
3.2 Access to global financial markets 
Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2007) propose a theory that has implications for country-wide 
spillover effects. They argue that financial globalization introduces incentives for firms to adopt 
better governance and move away from country-level determinants. They hypothesize that such 
mechanism is more likely in less economically developed countries and in countries with less 
developed financial markets.  
Panel B of Table 5 presents evidence for the Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2007) country-level 
governance mechanisms. The regressions use country-level measures of cross-border M&A 
activity (XVALC), and differences in GDP per capita (GDP_PC) and ratio of stock market 
capitalization to GDP (MKT_GDP) between acquirer and target country.   
The estimates show that XVALC is statistically insignificant. In addition, the interactions with 
GDP_PC and MKT_GDP of the country are insignificant. The overall country-level effect of 
cross-border M&As from a source country with stronger investor protection vis-à-vis the host 
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country (evaluated at the median GDP_PC and MKT_GDP) is statistically insignificant (the 
coefficient is -0.229 with p-value of 0.697). Our main explanatory variable XVAL  IP remains 
significant when we control for economic and financial development. The estimates in Column 
(3) imply that the overall effect of cross-border M&As (at the industry level) from a country with 
stronger investor protection vis-à-vis the host country is 0.086 with a p-value of 0.002.   
While we fail to find evidence of country-wide spillovers, it is possible that XVALC does not 
measure a relevant enough shock to the access to global financial markets and that our exercise 
has low power to test the theory in Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2007).  
3.3 Culture 
We investigate the possibility that spillover effects are not due to investor protection 
differences, but rather to cultural differences across countries. We extend the conceptual 
framework in Ahern, Daminelli, and Fracassi (2015) to consider that firm-level governance 
changes are more likely if the source country and the host country share similar cultural values. 
The cultural dimensions that we consider are trust, hierarchy, and individualism. We therefore 
hypothesize that cross-border M&A activity from countries with similar cultures lead to firm-
level governance improvements in non-target firms in the host country. 
Panel C of Table 5 presents evidence for the Ahern, Daminelli, and Fracassi (2015) 
mechanism using country-level measures of differences in cultural values. Because this 
mechanism is not about differences in investor protection, but rather differences in culture, we do 
not interact IP with the culture variables.   
The estimates in Columns (1)-(3) show that XVALC is insignificant as are the interactions of 
XVALC with trust differences (TRUST), hierarchy differences (HIERAR), and individualism 
differences (INDIV). Column (4) indicates that XVALC from countries that are further apart in 
terms of individualism contribute less to governance changes, while the other interactions with 
trust and hierarchy differences remain statistically insignificant. Our main explanatory variable 
XVAL  IP remains significant when we control for differences in culture. The estimates in 
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Column (4) imply that the overall effect of cross-border M&As (at the industry level) from a 
source country with stronger investor protection vis-à-vis the host country (XVAL + XVAL  IP) 
is 0.088 with a p-value of 0.01. The evidence suggests that governance spillovers are not driven 
by similarities in culture between acquirer and target country. 
3.4 Takeover market 
Pressures from the takeover market may induce changes in firms’ governance practices that 
resemble the spillover effects that we identify. We investigate two possible alternative stories. 
First, firms may opt for stronger governance so as to attract a takeover bid, perhaps by a foreign 
acquirer that demands stronger governance (e.g., Kumar and Ramchand 2008). If this story 
explains our findings, we would expect target firms to have better governance prior to a cross-
border takeover than non-target firms. In our sample, the average GOV for target firms in the 
year prior to the acquisition is 0.703 compared to 0.694 for the average GOV for non-target firms 
in the same industry and year; the difference is statistically insignificant.  
Second, the threat of a takeover may force competitors to shape up and avoid a “court of last 
resort” (Manne 1965; Jensen 1986; Scharfstein 1988). Cross border M&As could signal 
exposure to a larger takeover market. We measure DVALC as a dummy variable that equals one 
if the value of transactions-weighted average of the differences between acquirer and target 
domestic M&A activity (as a fraction of market capitalization) is positive.  
Panel D of Table 5, Column (1), shows some evidence for this mechanism in the form of a 
positive and significant interaction XVALC  DVALC coefficient, but the overall country-level 
effect (XVALC + XVALC × DVALC) is insignificant (coefficient is -0.033 with a p-value of 
0.905). While the XVAL × IP coefficient is insignificant at the 5% level, we find that the overall 
effect of cross-border M&As (at the industry level) from a source country with stronger investor 
protection vis-à-vis the host country is significant at 0.078 with a p-value of 0.011. 
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3.5 CEO labor market 
Changes in the executive labor market induced by cross-border M&As rather than by 
governance spillover effects via product market competition may explain our results. 
Improvements in governance could increase the amount of CEO incentive pay to incentivize 
CEOs to work harder (Acharya and Volpin 2010; Dicks 2012; Levit and Malenko 2016).  
We measure COMP as a dummy variable that equals one if the value of transactions-
weighted average of the differences between acquirer and target country median CEO total 
compensation is positive. The data source for compensation is Bloomberg ESG, the same source 
used to obtain the governance data. We use only observations for which we have at least five 
firms per country and year.  
Panel D of Table 5, Column (2), shows that the XVALC × COMP coefficient is insignificant 
as well as the overall country-level effect of XVALC + XVALC × COMP (coefficient is 0.108 
with a p-value of 0.883). Our main explanatory variable XVAL × IP remains significant, and the 
overall effect of cross-border M&As (at the industry level) from a source country with stronger 
investor protection vis-à-vis the host country is 0.099 with a p-value of 0.006. The evidence is 
inconsistent with governance changes responding to pressures from the CEO labor market.   
3.6 Technological efficiency of foreign acquirer 
Cross-border M&As can bring technological innovations that reduce the target firms’ 
marginal cost of production as well as the marginal cost of production of non-target firms 
operating in the same industry. To take advantage of lower marginal costs, firms may optimally 
choose to produce more, leading to higher revenues. To protect the additional revenues, firms 
would have an incentive to improve governance. This mechanism requires technological 
spillovers, which may be limited (Haddad and Harrison 1993; Aitken and Harrison 1999; 
Javorcik 2004; Haskel, Pereira, and Slaughter 2007). Without technological spillovers to peer 
firms, the revenues of the target firm would increase and those of the peer firms would decline as 
the target firm can grab a larger market share. In this scenario, peer firms might want weaker 
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governance and experience lower valuations. 
Panel D of Table 5, Column (3), tests this hypothesis using total factor productivity to 
measure technological efficiency. We measure TFP as a dummy variable that equals one if the 
value of transactions-weighted average of the differences between acquirer and target country 
total factor productivity is positive. There is a positive spillover effect from cross-border M&As 
that originate in countries with higher technological efficiency but the overall country-level 
effect of XVALC + XVALC × TFP coefficient is insignificant (coefficient is 0.311 with a p-
value of 0.263). Our main explanatory variable XVAL × IP remains significant, and the overall 
effect of cross-border M&As (at the industry level) from a source country with stronger investor 
protection vis-à-vis the host country is 0.078 with a p-value of 0.017. 
Overall, the evidence supports that cross-border M&A activity originating from a country 
with strong investor protection generates positive corporate governance spillovers in the host 
country to firms that operate in the same industry as the target firm. The spillover is more 
pronounced in industries with tougher product market competition. In contrast, access to global 
financial markets, cultural similarities, exposure to large takeover markets, CEO labor markets, 
and technological efficiency do not appear to explain our findings. 
4. Robustness 
We perform a variety of robustness checks of our findings. The Internet Appendix presents 
the results of these checks. First, we perform a placebo test by randomizing XVAL across firms to 
see if there is a governance spillover in unrelated industries. For this effect, we randomly shuffle 
the values for XVAL and IP (note that IP depends on XVAL being non-zero) by country, 
industry, and year. The randomization is performed 1,000 times preserving the cluster structure 
and jointly for XVAL and IP.13 Table IA.3 shows the average coefficient estimates and the 
																																																								
13 The false XVAL variable has the same sample moments as the original one, but its relation to the original sample 




standard z-score. The resulting false XVAL variable and its interactions with IP and HHI have 
no explanatory power. We conclude that spillovers are observed only in the same industry, which 
is consistent with the absence of significant country-wide effects (see Table 5), suggesting that 
the spillover effects operate through the product market competition mechanism.  
Second, we run the benchmark regressions in Table 4 using a sample that includes U.S. 
firms. Table IA.4 shows that the results are similar to those in Table 4.  
Third, we replace IO_TOTAL, which measures total institutional ownership, by IO_FOR, 
which measures foreign institutional ownership, in an attempt to control directly for the effect 
uncovered in Aggarwal et al. (2011). Table IA.5 shows that IO_FOR is positively associated 
with firm-level governance, but the interactions XVAL  IP and XVAL  IP  HHI remain 
statistically significant. In alternative, we replace IO_TOTAL by IO_ACT, which measures 
ownership by activist investors (e.g., hedge funds, private equity investors). Table IA.6 shows 
that firm-level governance does not appear to be associated with IO_ACT and the interactions 
XVAL  IP and XVAL  IP  HHI remain statistically significant.  
Fourth, we control for country-level improvements in corporate governance in each period by 
including country-year fixed effects in the benchmark regressions in Table 4. Table IA.7 reports 
the estimates. Even though this is a demanding specification, we still find a significant effect of 
XVAL  IP and of the triple interaction XVAL  IP  HHI on non-target firm governance. 
Fifth, we correct standard errors for clustering of observations at the country level (i.e., we 
assume observations are independent across countries, but not within countries) in alternative to 
firm level. Table IA.8 reports the estimates, which are consistent with those in Table 4. 
Sixth, Table IA.9 presents estimates in which the regression allows for leads and lags (-1, +1) 
of XVAL. The XVAL(t + 1) lead coefficient suggests that firms may change governance in 
anticipation to cross-border acquisitions but the effect is not as strong as the effect associated 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
does not preserve much of the correlation structure among regressors. Kennedy (1995) recommends using the 




with XVAL (t  1) lagged values. Given that XVAL is to some extent predictable, local firms may 
act on the anticipatory effect of the M&A. But the realization of the M&A should have an 
additional effect provided that XVAL is not fully predictable. 
Seventh, we estimate the effect of the interaction XVAL × IP on firm-level governance 
separately for the sample of diversifying deals (i.e., acquirer and target have the same two-digit 
SIC codes) and non-diversifying deals (i.e., acquirer and target have different two-digit SIC 
codes). Table IA.10 reports the estimates. We find that the governance spillovers are stronger, 
economically and statistically, in the sample of diversifying acquisitions. 
Finally, we estimate the effect of the interaction XVAL × IP on non-target firm governance 
using three alternative measures of investor protection taken from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer (2008): the anti-self-dealing index, the ex-ante anti-self-dealing index, and 
the ex-post anti self-dealing index. Table IA.11 reports these estimates. The results are in line 
with those using the anti-director rights index with the exception of the broad definition of the 
anti-self-dealing index for which the results are statistically insignificant. 
5. Endogeneity 
Studies of the effect of peer choices on firm policies have a potential omitted variable 
problem (Manski 1993; Leary and Roberts 2014). In our setting, the problem would arise if we 
were to run a regression of a firm’s own governance choices on its peers’ governance choices. 
Naturally, a correlation between the two variables would be seen because of a common omitted 
factor (reflection problem). Our experiment overcomes this challenge because we use the 
average cross-border M&A activity in a given country-industry (XVAL) as the independent 
variable rather than the governance choices of peer firms. Another potential concern with 
interpretation of the results is that causality could run the opposite way. Specifically, cross-
border M&As might occur more often (higher XVAL) when foreigners are expecting 
improvements in governance. To address these concerns, we conduct two tests.  
We first perform the regression analysis in Table 4 in the reverse direction, using GOV 
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(lagged) as the explanatory variable and XVAL as the dependent variable. We wish to determine 
whether cross-border M&As drive governance changes, or whether governance changes are 
intended to attract foreign bids. The regression also includes the same control variables used in 
Table 4. The results in Table IA.12 in the Internet Appendix show that the coefficient on GOV is 
statistically insignificant, which is inconsistent with reverse causality explaining our findings. 
Another approach to address reverse causality (and omitted variable bias) concerns is to use 
instrumental variable (IV) estimation. Our choice of instruments is guided by previous research. 
From the international trade literature, we use tariffs (TARIFFS), defined as the average tariff 
rate as a percentage of the sale price in a given country-industry, and import penetration (IMP), 
defined as the ratio of annual imports to sales in a given country-industry. TARIFFS and IMP 
provide information about plausibly exogenous factors driving up foreign bidder interest in a 
given country-industry, irrespective of any anticipation of governance changes. While TARIFFS 
is directly related to barriers to trade, IMP captures non-tradeability across industries besides 
being related to trade barriers. We expect TARIFFS to be positively related to XVAL, and IMP to 
be negatively related, as openness to imports is likely to go hand-in-hand with openness to FDI. 
From the finance literature, we use the annual value of U.S. domestic M&As (as a percentage of 
market capitalization) in a given industry (US_DVALC). We use US_DVALC as an instrument 
because it should be positively related to XVAL, as FDI is driven by M&A waves (in the spirit of 
Rajan and Zingales 1998). We expect DVALC to be positively related to XVAL. The exclusion 
restriction is likely to be satisfied as we are unaware of any theories that link M&A activity in 
the United States directly to governance changes elsewhere in the world.  
Table 6 shows the results of the IV estimation. The specification corresponds to that in 
Column (3) of Table 4, and XVAL, IP and XVAL × IP are the endogenous regressors. The 
regressions also include the same control variables as Table 4 as well as firm and year fixed-
effects. Columns (1)-(3) present the estimates of the first-stage regressions. We find that the 
instruments are correlated with XVAL in a way that is consistent with our predictions. Further, 
the estimates do not seem to suffer from a weak instruments problem as the Sanderson-
23 
 
Windmeijer F-statistic rejects the null of weak instruments in Columns (1)-(3).  
The second-stage estimates in Column (4) are consistent with a positive and significant 
corporate governance spillover effect following cross-border M&A activity in a given country-
industry when the source country has better investor protection than the host country. The XVAL 
 IP coefficient in Column (4) implies that the increase in predicted XVAL generated by a one-
standard-deviation increase in each of the excluded instruments is associated with an increase in 
non-target firms’ governance indexes of 2.8 percentage points, in cross-border M&As from a 
source country with better investor protection than that of the host country.14 This effect is not 
significantly different from the OLS effect in Column (3) of Table 4.15  
6. Real Effects 
In this section, we test the hypotheses that acquisitions by foreign rivals from countries with 
better investor protection than the host countries lead to increases in investment and valuation 
gains to shareholders of non-target firms that operate in the same industry as the target firm. 
6.1 Investment results 
We first investigate the hypothesis that cross-border M&A activity leads to spillovers in 
investment in non-target firms. We use the ratio of the change in property, plant, and equipment 
to lagged total assets (INV) as proxy for firm-level (net) investment rate. We conduct our tests 
using both OLS and IV methods.  
Table 7 presents the results. The XVAL  IP coefficient is positive and significant in the 
																																																								
14 Table IA.13 in the Internet Appendix reports instrumental variable estimates consistent to those in Table 6 when 
XVAL is calculated using only cross-border M&As in which the acquirer country investor protection is higher than 
that of the target country. In this case, the explanatory variable of interest is XVAL instead of the interaction term 
XVAL  IP. 
15 This effect captures the change in GOV induced by the variation in XVAL that is not related to other determinants 
of GOV. Using the estimates from the first-stage regressions, this corresponds to a change in XVAL of -0.0367  
0.049 + 0.0040  0.965 + 0.0104  0.035 = 0.0024. The estimated change in GOV is (-1.0225 + 12.6823)  0.0024 = 
0.0280. The 90% confidence interval of the overall effect is [0.0012, 0.0547], which overlaps with the 90% 
confidence interval of the overall effect using the OLS estimate [0.0007, 0.0040] (point estimate of 0.0023). 
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OLS regressions in Columns (3) and (5), which indicates that cross-border M&As from countries 
with better investor protection than the host country are associated with increases in investment 
for non-target firms operating in the same industry and country as the target. Column (5) shows a 
less pronounced increase in investment in less competitive industries, as indicated by the 
negative and significant coefficient on XVAL × IP × HHI variable, consistent with the product 
market competition mechanism. A one-standard-deviation change in cross-border M&A from a 
country with stronger investor protection vis-à-vis the host country results in a change that 
represents 16% of the average investment rate (24% in perfectly competitive industries). Column 
(6) of Table 7 presents the IV second-stage estimates using the same instruments as in Table 6 
(TARIFFS, IMP and US_DVALC). Consistent with the OLS estimates, we find that the 
coefficient on the XVAL  IP interaction variable is positive and statistically significant.  
Overall, our findings suggest that governance spillovers are an important channel to explain 
industry-wide increases in investment following cross-border M&As. 
6.2 Valuation results 
We next investigate the hypothesis that cross-border M&A activity leads to firm valuation 
gains in non-target firms using Tobin’s Q (TOBIN_Q) as the valuation measure.  
The valuation results are subject to conflicting sources of variation because cross-border 
M&As may generate both productivity and governance effects in the target firm. While an 
improvement in the target firm’s governance has a positive effect on the valuation of non-target 
firms in the same industry, an improvement in the target firm’s productivity has a negative effect 
on the valuation of non-target firms, all else equal.16 As the two effects are correlated with 
governance changes, it may be difficult to identify the effect of governance improvements on 
non-target firm valuation.  
																																																								
16 Table IA.14 in the Internet Appendix reports that the unexpected component of GOV has in-sample predictive 
power for firm valuation (measured by the logarithm of Tobin’s Q). A one-standard-deviation increase in the 
unexpected component of GOV is associated with an increase in Tobin’s Q of 0.36% (= 0.0716  0.05).  
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Table 8 presents the estimates of firm valuation regressions. The table shows that the 
coefficient on the XVAL  IP interaction is positive and significant in the OLS regressions in 
Columns (3) and (5) as predicted. The effect of cross border flows is economically weaker in less 
competitive industries in Columns (4) and (5). A one-standard-deviation change in cross-border 
M&A from a country with stronger investor protection vis-à-vis the host country results in an 
increase of 0.8% in Tobin’s Q (2.4% in perfectly competitive industries). Column (6) presents 
the IV second-stage estimates using the same instruments as in Tables 6 and 7 (TARIFFS, IMP 
and US_DVALC). We find that the coefficient on the XVAL  IP interaction variable is no 
longer statistically significant. While the valuation results using OLS regressions support our 
hypothesis, we do not find a positive valuation spillover effect when we use an IV approach to 
account for the potential endogeneity of XVAL. 
Overall, we find that cross-border M&A activity in an industry generates positive firm 
valuation spillovers to other local firms that operate in the same industry as the target. Product 
market competition and differences in investor protection are important conditions for valuation 
spillovers to occur.  
7. Conclusion 
We test the hypothesis that cross-border M&A activity from countries with better investor 
protection is a source of functional convergence, leading to corporate governance improvements 
in the host country. We provide evidence consistent with spillovers to non-target firms in the 
same country and industry as the target firm, but not to non-target firms in other industries. This 
allows us to distinguish across several mechanisms for governance spillovers that may be at 
work, in particular product market competition. Furthermore, cross-border M&As lead to 
increases in investment and market valuation of non-target firms, suggesting that FDI not only 
affects corporate governance, but also produces real effects.  
Our findings establish a direct link between FDI and the adoption of corporate governance 
practices that promote corporate accountability and empower shareholders worldwide. To our 
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knowledge, our paper is the first to provide direct evidence that FDI produces corporate 
governance improvements that are not restricted to target firms but spill over to the target firm’s 
industry rivals. Our findings show that market forces, namely the international market for 
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Corporate governance and cross-border M&As by target country 
This table shows number of observations, number of firms, mean, and standard deviation of the corporate 
governance index (GOV) and annual transaction value of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the 
target firm’s country-industry as a fraction of market capitalization (XVAL). The sample consists of FactSet firms for 












Argentina 30 8 0.650 0.083 0.020 0.042 
Australia 1,975 333 0.706 0.093 0.028 0.064 
Austria 47 16 0.735 0.089 0.011 0.028 
Belgium 75 23 0.639 0.105 0.049 0.096 
Bermuda 50 21 0.705 0.101 0.013 0.015 
Brazil 526 127 0.716 0.060 0.010 0.044 
Canada 1,584 284 0.821 0.084 0.018 0.034 
Chile 30 12 0.719 0.073 0.010 0.020 
China 6,052 1,115 0.706 0.065 0.001 0.004 
Colombia 23 10 0.742 0.063 0.000 0.000 
Denmark 112 29 0.724 0.089 0.021 0.075 
Finland 76 40 0.726 0.083 0.014 0.024 
France 660 114 0.633 0.123 0.013 0.045 
Germany 138 42 0.745 0.075 0.015 0.044 
Greece 30 16 0.640 0.078 0.003 0.006 
Hong Kong 711 157 0.631 0.112 0.004 0.023 
India 3,597 765 0.600 0.108 0.004 0.009 
Indonesia 167 57 0.628 0.071 0.001 0.004 
Israel 74 20 0.709 0.090 0.010 0.014 
Italy 279 59 0.728 0.069 0.018 0.059 
Japan 10,453 1,926 0.672 0.046 0.002 0.015 
Luxembourg 30 11 0.723 0.133 0.008 0.018 
Malaysia 273 67 0.608 0.105 0.004 0.018 
Mexico 125 39 0.688 0.074 0.012 0.027 
Netherlands 222 55 0.764 0.084 0.029 0.067 
New Zealand 71 25 0.707 0.097 0.012 0.028 
Norway 154 41 0.744 0.080 0.039 0.087 
Pakistan 23 13 0.620 0.116 0.003 0.000 
Peru 13 6 0.663 0.087 0.077 0.155 
Philippines 121 37 0.607 0.112 0.001 0.006 
Poland 36 11 0.641 0.078 0.052 0.116 
Portugal 39 10 0.694 0.062 0.016 0.038 
Russian Federation 137 45 0.671 0.103 0.005 0.026 
Singapore 325 67 0.683 0.115 0.019 0.063 
South Africa 405 93 0.664 0.102 0.008 0.035 
South Korea 175 35 0.671 0.062 0.002 0.015 
Spain 214 48 0.658 0.090 0.017 0.047 
Sweden 354 73 0.698 0.109 0.020 0.046 
Switzerland 156 39 0.808 0.094 0.005 0.008 
Taiwan 1,161 307 0.629 0.071 0.001 0.003 
Thailand 106 35 0.602 0.096 0.001 0.002 
Turkey 100 37 0.693 0.060 0.007 0.051 
United Kingdom 2,477 370 0.767 0.077 0.030 0.064 
United Arab Emirates 26 12 0.721 0.102 0.005 0.014 
Other 66 41 
Total 33,498 6,691 0.686 0.094 0.009 0.035 




Corporate governance and cross-border M&As by target industry 
This table shows number of observations, number of firm, mean, and standard deviation of the corporate governance 
index (GOV) and annual transaction value of cross-border M&As in the target firm’s country-industry as a fraction 
of market capitalization (XVAL) for each industry with at least five firms. Panel A reports the top ten industries and 
panel B reports the bottom ten industries in terms of XVAL. The sample consists of FactSet firms for which GOV 











Panel A: Top ten industries 
Trucking & warehousing 181 36 0.672 0.068 0.035 0.082 
Oil & gas extraction 919 173 0.748 0.112 0.028 0.052 
Coal mining 276 58 0.694 0.073 0.027 0.074 
Wholesale trade, nondurable goods 464 98 0.698 0.075 0.026 0.070 
Hotels & other lodging places 215 44 0.643 0.111 0.021 0.065 
Lumber & wood products 56 15 0.757 0.094 0.017 0.067 
Agricultural services 37 11 0.684 0.102 0.017 0.073 
Petroleum & coal products 64 29 0.724 0.094 0.017 0.079 
Miscellaneous retail 367 77 0.684 0.085 0.015 0.067 
Business services 2,129 431 0.682 0.093 0.015 0.038 
Panel B: Bottom ten industries 
Misc. manufacturing industries 184 39 0.673 0.060 0.001 0.016 
Auto dealers & service stations 67 17 0.734 0.082 0.001 0.006 
Educational services 78 18 0.685 0.080 0.001 0.007 
Furniture & home furnishings stores 113 23 0.675 0.067 0.001 0.004 
Heavy construction, except building 444 95 0.688 0.081 0.001 0.007 
Food stores 360 73 0.699 0.070 0.001 0.005 
General merchandise stores 235 52 0.695 0.067 0.000 0.002 
Personal services 42 13 0.685 0.065 0.000 0.001 
Depository institutions 31 8 0.647 0.096 0.000 0.000 








This table shows mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, and number of observations for each 
variable. The sample consists of FactSet firms for which corporate governance index (GOV) data are available in the 
2005-2014 period. Variable definitions are provided in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
Variable Mean Median 
Standard 
deviation Minimum Maximum 
Number of 
observations 
GOV 0.686 0.688 0.094 0.188 1.000 33,498 
XVAL 0.009 0.000 0.035 0.000 0.427 33,498 
IP 0.170 0.000 0.376 0.000 1.000 33,498 
HHI 0.096 0.076 0.087 0.009 1.000 33,498 
DVAL 0.010 0.001 0.030 0.000 0.366 33,498 
TOBIN_Q 1.628 1.183 1.744 0.381 98.250 33,427 
INV 0.017 0.006 0.077 -0.259 0.379 33,416 
ASSETS 5,703 1,072 19,649 0.000 443,000 33,498 
LEVERAGE 0.232 0.214 0.180 0.000 0.972 33,498 
CASH 0.154 0.115 0.141 0.000 0.993 33,498 
CAPEX 0.055 0.038 0.058 0.000 0.437 33,498 
PPE 0.321 0.284 0.226 0.000 0.946 33,498 
ROA 0.080 0.071 0.089 -2.878 0.411 33,498 
MB 2.446 1.509 3.217 0.002 36.470 33,498 
SGROWTH 0.158 0.092 0.392 -1.000 3.725 33,498 
R&D 0.011 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.308 33,498 
FXSALES 0.244 0.033 0.325 0.000 1.000 33,498 
ANALYST 6.040 3.000 7.295 0.000 56.000 33,498 
ADR 0.050 0.000 0.218 0.000 1.000 33,498 
CLOSE 0.338 0.339 0.262 0.000 1.000 33,498 
IO_TOTAL 0.134 0.082 0.159 0.000 1.000 33,498 
XVALC 0.005 0.002 0.009 0.000 0.108 33,384 
IPC 0.295 0.000 0.456 0.000 1.000 33,384 
GDP_PC 14,013 14,307 17,994 -41,535 61,417 33,498 
MKT_GDP 67.31 32.73 178.66 -740.95 950.08 33,498 
TRUST 0.021 0.000 0.050 0.000 0.348 33,384 
HIERAR 0.018 0.000 0.044 0.000 0.261 33,384 
INDIV 0.013 0.000 0.032 0.000 0.195 33,384 
DVALC 0.783 1.000 0.412 0.000 1.000 33,496 
DVALC 0.170 0.000 0.376 0.000 1.000 33,496 
COMP 0.865 1.000 0.341 0.000 1.000 27,508 
TFP 0.327 0.000 0.469 0.000 1.000 33,383 
TARIFFS 0.023 0.000 0.049 0.000 0.605 33,498 
IMP 0.351 0.000 0.965 0.000 10.350 33,498 





Table 4  
Cross-border M&As and non-target corporate governance 
This table presents estimates of firm fixed effects panel regressions of the corporate governance index (GOV) on the 
value of cross-border M&As in a target firm’s country-industry as a fraction of market capitalization (XVAL). IP 
(dummy variable) is the difference in investor protection between acquirer country and target country in a given 
target firm’s country-industry. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of market shares based on U.S. sales in a 
given industry. Regressions include year fixed effects. All explanatory variables are lagged one year. The sample 
consists of FactSet firms for which GOV data are available in the 2005-2014 period. Variable definitions are 
provided in Table A2 in the Appendix. Robust p-values adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in brackets. *, 
**, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
XVAL 0.0021 -0.0189 0.0169 -0.0202 
(0.876) (0.203) (0.363) (0.297) 
IP 0.0009 0.0008 
(0.421) (0.685) 
XVAL  IP 0.0857*** 0.1672*** 
(0.007) (0.000) 
HHI 0.0416** 0.0415** 
(0.030) (0.030) 
XVAL  HHI -0.1295 0.0093 
(0.230) (0.923) 
IP × HHI 0.0008 
(0.972) 
XVAL  IP  HHI -0.9585** 
(0.017) 
DVAL -0.0329*** -0.0320** -0.0333*** -0.0316** 
(0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.011) 
ASSETS (log) 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0010 0.0010 
(0.626) (0.634) (0.625) (0.596) (0.574) 
LEVERAGE -0.0084 -0.0084 -0.0084 -0.0081 -0.0082 
(0.258) (0.261) (0.259) (0.277) (0.267) 
CASH -0.0088 -0.0088 -0.0089 -0.0089 -0.0089 
(0.241) (0.238) (0.236) (0.235) (0.233) 
CAPEX 0.0198 0.0195 0.0197 0.0194 0.0199 
(0.107) (0.112) (0.109) (0.114) (0.105) 
PPE -0.0031 -0.0031 -0.0031 -0.0029 -0.0029 
(0.670) (0.667) (0.671) (0.689) (0.695) 
ROA 0.0277*** 0.0275*** 0.0276*** 0.0277*** 0.0282*** 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) 
MB -0.0005** -0.0005** -0.0005** -0.0005** -0.0005** 
(0.039) (0.036) (0.039) (0.028) (0.031) 
SGROWTH -0.0015 -0.0014 -0.0013 -0.0015 -0.0014 
(0.329) (0.346) (0.371) (0.328) (0.349) 
R&D 0.2038*** 0.2043*** 0.2031*** 0.2037*** 0.2021*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FXSALES -0.0026 -0.0027 -0.0028 -0.0027 -0.0028 
(0.624) (0.609) (0.599) (0.616) (0.603) 
ANALYST -0.0009*** -0.0009*** -0.0009*** -0.0009*** -0.0009*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ADR 0.0169 0.0171 0.0170 0.0171 0.0168 
(0.128) (0.123) (0.124) (0.123) (0.129) 
CLOSE 0.0057* 0.0057* 0.0057* 0.0055* 0.0053 
(0.087) (0.088) (0.088) (0.098) (0.111) 
IO_TOTAL 0.0581*** 0.0585*** 0.0583*** 0.0590*** 0.0586*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of observations 33,498 33,498 33,498 33,498 33,498 
Number of firms 6,691 6,691 6,691 6,691 6,691 
R-squared 0.124 0.124 0.124 0.124 0.125 
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Table 5  
Cross-border M&As and non-target corporate governance: Alternative hypotheses 
This table presents estimates of firm fixed effects panel regressions of the corporate governance index (GOV) on the 
value of cross-border M&As in a target firm’s country-industry as a fraction of market capitalization (XVAL). IP 
(dummy variable) is the difference in investor protection between acquirer country and target country in a given 
target firm’s country-industry. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of market shares based on U.S. sales in a 
given industry. XVALC is the value of cross-border M&As in a country as a fraction of market capitalization. IPC 
(dummy variable) is the difference in investor protection between acquirer country and target country. GDP_PC is 
the difference in GDP per capita in dollars between acquirer country and target country. MKT_GDP is the 
difference in ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP between acquirer country and target country. TRUST, 
HIERAR and INDIV are the differences in trust, hierarchy and individualism between acquirer country and target 
country. DVALC (dummy variable) is the difference in domestic M&A activity (as a fraction of market 
capitalization) between acquirer country and target country. COMP (dummy variable) is the difference in median 
CEO compensation between acquirer country and target country. TFP (dummy variable) is the difference in total 
factor productivity between acquirer country and target country. Regressions include the country-level measure of 
domestic M&As activity (DVALC), the same firm-level control variables as in Table 4 (coefficients not shown) and 
year fixed effects. All explanatory variables are lagged one year. The sample consists of FactSet firms for which 
GOV data are available in the 2005-2014 period. Variable definitions are provided in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
Robust p-values adjusted for country-level clustering are reported in brackets. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Country-level effects 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
XVALC -0.4733 -0.4640 -0.3289 -0.3844 
(0.281) (0.392) (0.438) (0.506) 
IPC 0.0060 0.0023 
(0.565) (0.816) 
XVALC  IPC -0.0603 0.2476 
(0.914) (0.668) 
HHI 0.0504* 0.0355 
(0.093) (0.193) 
XVALC  HHI -1.5579 -0.8732 
(0.303) (0.524) 
IPC  HHI 0.0530 
(0.140) 
XVALC  IPC  HHI -3.6476** 
(0.041) 
XVAL 0.0024 0.0028 0.0019 0.0025 
(0.923) (0.918) (0.940) (0.928) 
IP 0.0007 0.0005 0.0006 0.0003 
(0.698) (0.792) (0.729) (0.881) 
XVAL  IP 0.0884*** 0.0855** 0.0867*** 0.0797** 
(0.003) (0.027) (0.004) (0.037) 
Number of observations 33,498 33,410 33,498 33,410 
Number of firms 6,627 6,657 6,627 6,657 









Panel B: Access to global financial markets 
 (1) (2) (3) 
XVALC -0.4695 -0.4568 -0.4391 
(0.289) (0.271) (0.306) 
GDP_PC 0.0000 0.0000 
(0.575) (0.605) 
XVALC  GDP_PC 0.0000 0.0000 
(0.511) (0.683) 
MKT_GDP 0.0000 0.0000 
(0.413) (0.522) 
XVALC  MKT_GDP 0.0047 0.0027 
(0.202) (0.615) 
GDP_PC  MKT_GDP -0.0000 
(0.689) 
XVALC  GDP_PC  MKT_GDP -0.0000 
(0.903) 
XVAL -0.0015 0.0047 0.0008 
(0.948) (0.848) (0.971) 
IP 0.0012 0.0008 0.0014 
(0.505) (0.642) (0.460) 
XVAL  IP 0.0927*** 0.0813*** 0.0855*** 
(0.002) (0.010) (0.005) 
Number of observations 33,498 33,498 33,498 
Number of firms 6,687 6,687 6,687 









Panel C: Culture 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
XVALC -0.5462 -0.4263 -0.4366 -0.5281 
(0.248) (0.149) (0.109) (0.103) 
TRUST 0.1049 -0.0187 
(0.409) (0.891) 
XVALC  TRUST 0.3555 5.6320 
(0.873) (0.152) 
HIERAR -0.1799** -0.2738*** 
(0.041) (0.002) 
XVALC  HIERAR -3.3399 3.0423 
(0.535) (0.664) 
INDIV 0.2911 0.4609** 
(0.160) (0.013) 
XVALC  INDIV 0.6009 -20.2156* 
(0.937) (0.063) 
XVAL 0.0041 0.0043 0.0116 0.0125 
(0.863) (0.857) (0.593) (0.557) 
IP 0.0009 0.0004 0.0006 0.0004 
(0.646) (0.809) (0.755) (0.828) 
XVAL  IP 0.0813** 0.0890*** 0.0733** 0.0758** 
(0.016) (0.002) (0.019) (0.050) 
Number of observations 33,498 33,498 33,498 33,498 
Number of firms 6,691 6,691 6,691 6,691 









Panel D: Domestic M&A, CEO compensation and total factor 
productivity 
(1) (2) (3) 
XVALC -0.8199* -0.4712 -0.9003* 
(0.092) (0.216) (0.072) 
DVALC 0.0089 
(0.182) 








XVALC  TFP 1.2110*** 
(0.006) 
XVAL 0.0102 0.0086 0.0112 
(0.710) (0.699) (0.647) 
IP 0.0016 0.0008 0.0003 
(0.368) (0.545) (0.875) 
XVAL  IP 0.0675 0.0905** 0.0672* 
(0.124) (0.038) (0.074) 
Number of observations 33,496 27,508 33,383 
Number of firms 6,691 6,336 6,636 







Cross-border M&As and non-target corporate governance: Instrumental variables 
This table presents estimates of instrumental variable estimates of firm fixed effects panel regressions of corporate 
governance index (GOV) on the value of cross-border M&As in a target firm’s country-industry as a fraction of 
market capitalization (XVAL). IP (dummy variable) is the difference in investor protection between acquirer 
country and target country in a given target firm’s country-industry. XVAL, IP and XVAL × IP are the endogenous 
variables and TARIFFS, IMP and US_DVALC are the instruments. Regressions include year fixed effects. All 
explanatory variables are lagged one year. The sample consists of FactSet firms for which GOV data are available in 
the 2004-2008 period. Variable definitions are provided in Table A2 in the Appendix. Robust p-values adjusted for 
firm-level clustering are reported in brackets. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively.  
 First stage  Second stage 
XVAL IP XVAL  IP GOV 





XVAL  IP 12.6823** 
(0.047) 
TARIFFS -0.0367*** 0.3286*** -0.0045* 
(0.000) (0.009) (0.072) 
IMP 0.0040** 0.0039 -0.0007 
(0.040) (0.621) (0.189) 
US_DVALC 0.0104* -0.3345*** -0.0026 
(0.089) (0.000) (0.480) 
DVAL 0.0271 0.1447** -0.0066 0.0942 
(0.110) (0.039) (0.518) (0.375) 
ASSETS (log) -0.0003 -0.0053 -0.0003 0.0024 
(0.712) (0.437) (0.394) (0.613) 
LEVERAGE 0.0032 0.0560** 0.0004 -0.0022 
(0.317) (0.042) (0.792) (0.924) 
CASH 0.0015 0.0253 0.0005 -0.01 
(0.663) (0.418) (0.817) (0.695) 
CAPEX 0.0093 -0.1647*** 0.0023 -0.0212 
(0.125) (0.001) (0.507) (0.625) 
PPE -0.0043 0.0257 -0.0023 0.0243 
(0.118) (0.365) (0.168) (0.319) 
ROA 0.0081** 0.0228 0.0009 0.0265 
(0.045) (0.536) (0.637) (0.371) 
MB -0.0002** -0.0013 -0.0001* 0.0008 
(0.022) (0.171) (0.065) (0.470) 
SGROWTH -0.0011 -0.0127** -0.0010** 0.0089 
(0.216) (0.032) (0.013) (0.350) 
R&D 0.0106 0.6921*** 0.0078 0.1712 
(0.580) (0.002) (0.539) (0.439) 
FXSALES -0.0014 0.0574*** 0.0001 0.0024 
(0.529) (0.002) (0.940) (0.873) 
ANALYST -0.0001 0.0008 -0.0001 -0.0001 
(0.134) (0.195) (0.125) (0.925) 
ADR 0.0095 0.0306 0.0033 -0.012 
(0.151) (0.463) (0.357) (0.842) 
CLOSE 0.0043*** 0.0254* 0.0005 0.0049 
(0.003) (0.076) (0.561) (0.730) 
IO_TOTAL -0.0089* -0.1316*** 0.0016 0.0119 
(0.060) (0.000) (0.559) (0.783) 
Sanderson-Windmeijer F-statistic 10.96 14.04 8.85 
[p-value] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Number of observations 32,864 32,864 32,864 32,864 
Number of firms 6,057 6,057 6,057 6,057 
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Table 7  
Cross-border M&As and non-target investment 
This table presents estimates of firm fixed effects panel regressions of the investment rate (INV) on the value of 
cross-border M&As in a target firm’s country-industry as a fraction of market capitalization (XVAL). IP (dummy 
variable) is the difference in investor protection between acquirer country and target country in a given target firm’s 
country-industry. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of market shares based on U.S. sales in a given industry. 
Column (6) presents instrumental variable (IV) estimates in which XVAL, IP and XVAL × IP are the endogenous 
variables and TARIFFS, IMP and US_DVALC are the instruments. Regressions include year fixed effects. All 
explanatory variables are lagged one year. The sample consists of FactSet firms for which corporate governance 
index (GOV) data are available in the 2005-2014 period. Variable definitions are provided in Table A2 in the 
Appendix. Robust p-values adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in brackets. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects IV
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
XVAL 0.0032 -0.0158 -0.0076 -0.0411** 1.6934 
(0.825) (0.319) (0.704) (0.044) (0.501) 
IP -0.0042*** -0.0046** -0.1185 
(0.002) (0.047) (0.636) 
XVAL  IP 0.0940*** 0.1589*** 20.4584* 
(0.005) (0.002) (0.056) 
HHI -0.0522** -0.0515** 
(0.013) (0.014) 
XVAL  HHI 0.0952 0.2040* 
(0.446) (0.080) 
IP  HHI 0.0059 
(0.811) 
XVAL  IP  HHI -0.6771* 
(0.069) 
DVAL -0.0189 -0.0172 -0.0187 -0.0164 0.0897 
(0.260) (0.305) (0.262) (0.325) (0.647) 
ASSETS (log) -0.0317*** -0.0317*** -0.0317*** -0.0318*** -0.0318*** -0.0277*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
LEVERAGE -0.0505*** -0.0505*** -0.0503*** -0.0509*** -0.0507*** -0.0569 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.162) 
CASH 0.0408*** 0.0407*** 0.0408*** 0.0408*** 0.0409*** 0.0326 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.484) 
PPE -0.1341*** -0.1342*** -0.1341*** -0.1344*** -0.1343*** -0.0888** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.026) 
ROA 0.0767*** 0.0766*** 0.0768*** 0.0765*** 0.0769*** 0.0467 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.367) 
MB 0.0017*** 0.0017*** 0.0017*** 0.0017*** 0.0017*** 0.0047** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) 
SGROWTH 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005 0.0006 0.0006 0.0212 
(0.807) (0.794) (0.787) (0.761) (0.754) (0.199) 
R&D 0.0958** 0.0961** 0.0978** 0.0969** 0.0983** -0.0425 
(0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.915) 
FXSALES -0.0061 -0.0062 -0.0059 -0.0062 -0.0060 0.0021 
(0.252) (0.247) (0.264) (0.242) (0.256) (0.936) 
ANALYST 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.0024** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.031) 
ADR -0.0046 -0.0046 -0.0045 -0.0046 -0.0047 -0.0837 
(0.586) (0.592) (0.597) (0.585) (0.580) (0.452) 
CLOSE 0.0130*** 0.0129*** 0.0130*** 0.0131*** 0.0131*** -0.0042 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.868) 
IO_TOTAL 0.0291*** 0.0294*** 0.0285*** 0.0287*** 0.0277*** -0.0033 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.969) 
Number of observations 33,416 33,416 33,416 33,416 33,416 32,780 
Number of firms 6,684 6,684 6,684 6,684 6,684 6,048 
R-squared 0.185 0.185 0.186 0.186 0.186  
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Table 8  
Cross-border M&As and non-target firm valuation 
This table presents estimates of firm fixed effects panel regressions of the logarithm of Tobin’s Q (TOBIN_Q) on the 
value of cross-border M&As in a target firm’s country-industry as a fraction of market capitalization (XVAL). IP 
(dummy variable) is the difference in investor protection between acquirer country and target country in a given 
target firm’s country-industry. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of market shares based on U.S. sales in a 
given industry. Column (6) presents instrumental variable (IV) estimates in which XVAL, IP and XVAL × IP are 
the endogenous variables and TARIFFS, IMP and US_DVALC are the instruments. Regressions include year fixed 
effects. All explanatory variables are lagged one year. The sample consists of FactSet firms for which corporate 
governance index (GOV) data are available in the 2005-2014 period. Variable definitions are provided in Table A2 
in the Appendix. Robust p-values adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in brackets. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
XVAL 0.0516 -0.0181 0.1745** 0.0583 -0.1017 
(0.364) (0.766) (0.014) (0.419) (0.976) 
IP 0.0142*** -0.0091 -0.5372* 
(0.009) (0.338) (0.080) 
XVAL  IP 0.2367* 0.6230*** -19.1934 
(0.087) (0.002) (0.230) 
HHI 0.4576*** 0.4492*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
XVAL  HHI -1.0770*** -0.6181** 
(0.001) (0.031) 
IP  HHI 0.2847*** 
(0.009) 
XVAL  IP  HHI -5.0519*** 
(0.004) 
DVAL 0.0051 0.0061 0.0025 0.0048 -0.0349 
(0.917) (0.902) (0.959) (0.923) (0.871) 
ASSETS (log) -0.2405*** -0.2405*** -0.2414*** -0.2391*** -0.2393*** -0.2447*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LEVERAGE 0.0106 0.0105 0.0073 0.0128 0.0087 0.036 
(0.774) (0.776) (0.842) (0.729) (0.813) (0.523) 
CASH 0.2736*** 0.2736*** 0.2680*** 0.2729*** 0.2671*** 0.2931*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CAPEX 0.1318** 0.1315** 0.1315** 0.1301** 0.1321** 0.0858 
(0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.032) (0.030) (0.420) 
PPE 0.0290 0.0292 0.0281 0.0316 0.0304 -0.0001 
(0.414) (0.411) (0.431) (0.370) (0.391) (0.999) 
ROA 0.6569*** 0.6566*** 0.6568*** 0.6570*** 0.6594*** 0.6712*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SGROWTH 0.0438*** 0.0439*** 0.0443*** 0.0431*** 0.0435*** 0.0161 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.509) 
R&D -0.9229*** -0.9234*** -0.9332*** -0.9311*** -0.9364*** -0.4174 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.425) 
FXSALES -0.0019 -0.0018 -0.0048 -0.0012 -0.0045 0.0323 
(0.940) (0.942) (0.852) (0.962) (0.862) (0.418) 
ANALYST 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0006 
(0.831) (0.825) (0.822) (0.853) (0.889) (0.706) 
ADR -0.0233 -0.0237 -0.0234 -0.0233 -0.0230 0.0548 
(0.518) (0.511) (0.518) (0.518) (0.526) (0.647) 
CLOSE -0.0190 -0.0192 -0.0204 -0.0209 -0.0229 0.0036 
(0.213) (0.209) (0.184) (0.172) (0.138) (0.915) 
IO_TOTAL 0.3093*** 0.3098*** 0.3135*** 0.3149*** 0.3191*** 0.2643*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) 
Number of observations 33,427 33,427 33,156 33,427 33,156 32,790 
Number of firms 6,687 6,687 6,627 6,687 6,627 6,050 





Firm-level governance attributes 
 
Panel A: Board of directors 
1 All directors attended 75% of board meetings or had a valid excuse 
2 CEO and executive directors serve on the boards of two or fewer public companies 
3 Board is controlled by more than 50% independent directors 
4 Board size is at greater than five but less than sixteen 
5 Compensation committee composed solely of independent directors 
6 Chairman and CEO positions are separated, or there is a lead director 
7 Annually elected board (no staggered board) 
8 Non-executive directors have three or fewer outside directorships 
Panel B: Audit 
9 Audit committee composed solely of independent directors 
10 Auditors ratified at most recent annual meeting 
Panel C: Anti-takeover provisions 
11 Single class, common shares 
12 Company either has no poison pill or a pill that is shareholder approved 
13 Company is not authorized to issue blank check preferred 
Panel D: Compensation and ownership 
14 Executives are subject to stock ownership guidelines 
15 No interlocks among compensation committee members 






GOV Firm-level index of corporate governance based on 16 attributes on board, audit, anti-takeover provisions, and compensation and ownership structure 
(Bloomberg ESG).  
XVAL Value of cross-border M&As of public parent targets (SDC Platinum) divided by market capitalization in a country-industry (two-digit SIC level). 
IP Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the value of transactions-weighted average difference between acquirer and target country anti-director rights 
index (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008) in a given target firm’s country-industry (two-digit SIC level) is positive, and zero 
otherwise.  
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman index of the market shares in a industry (two-digit SIC level) calculated using sales of U.S. firms. 
DVAL Value of domestic M&As (SDC Platinum) divided by market capitalization in a country-industry (two-digit SIC level). 
TOBIN_Q Total assets (FactSet item FF_ASSETS) plus market value of equity (Factstet item FF_MKT_VAL) minus book value of equity (Factstet item 
FF_COM_EQ) divided by total assets. 
INV Change in property, plant and equipment (FactSet item PPE_NET) divided by lagged total assets (FactSet item FF_ASSETS). 
ASSETS Total assets in million of U.S. dollars (FactSet item FF_ASSETS). 
LEVERAGE Total debt (FactSet item FF_DEBT) divided by total assets (FactSet item FF_ASSETS). 
CASH Cash and short-term investments (FactSet item FF_CASH_ST) divided by total assets (FactSet item FF_ASSETS). 
CAPEX Capital expenditures (FactSet item FF_CAPEX_FIX) divided by total assets (FactSet item FF_ASSETS). 
PPE Property, plant, and equipment (FactSet item PPE_NET) divided by total assets (FactSet item FF_ASSETS). 
CLOSE Number of shares held by insiders (shareholders who hold 5% or more of the outstanding shares, such as officers, directors, and immediate families, other 
corporations or individuals), as a fraction of the number of shares outstanding (FactSet item FF_SHS_CLOSELY_HELD_PCT). 
ROA Operating income (FactSet item FF_OPER_INC) plus interest expenses (FactSet  item FF_INT_EXP_DEBT) divided by total assets (FactSet item 
FF_ASSETS). 
MB Market value of equity (FactSet item FF_MKT_VAL) divided by book value of equity (FactSet item FF_COM_EQ). 
SGROWTH Two-year  geometric average of annual growth rate in sales in U.S.dollars (FactSet item FF_SALES). 
R&D Research and development expenditures (FactSet item FF_RD_EXP) divided by total assets (FactSet item FF_ASSETS). 
FXSALES International sales as a proportion of sales (FactSet item (FactSet item FF_FOR_SALES_PCT). 
ANALYST Number of analysts following a firm (IBES). 
ADR Dummy that equals one if a firm is cross-listed on a U.S. exchange through a level 2-3 ADR or ordinary listing, and zero otherwise (major depositary 
institutions and U.S. stock exchanges). 
IO_TOTAL Holdings by institutional investors as a fraction of market capitalization (FactSet). 








IPC Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the value of transactions-weighted average difference between acquirer and target country anti-director rights 
index (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008) is positive, and zero otherwise. 
DVALC Value of domestic M&As of public parent targets (SDC Platinum) divided by market capitalization in a country. 
GDP_PC Value of transactions-weighted average difference between acquirer and target country gross domestic product per capita in U.S. dollars (World Bank). 
MKT_GDP Value of transactions-weighted average difference between acquirer and target country  ratio of stock market capitalization to gross domestic product 
(World Bank). 
TRUST Value of transactions-weighted average difference between acquirer and target country  trust, defined as whether people believe most other people can be 
trusted or not (World Values Survey). 
HIERAR Value of transactions-weighted average difference between acquirer and target country hierarchy, defined as whether people believe they should follow 
instructions from a superior at work even if they do agree versus having to be convinced first (World Values Survey). 
INDIV Value of transactions-weighted average difference between acquirer and target country individualism, defined as whether people believe income 
differences are an incentive for effort versus whether incomes should be made more equal (World Values Survey). 
DVALC 
 
Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the value of transactions-weighted average difference between acquirer and target country domestic M&As (as 
a fraction of market capitalization) is positive, and zero otherwise. 
COMP Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the value of transactions-weighted average difference between acquirer and target country median CEO 
compensation is positive, and zero otherwise. 
TFP Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the value of transactions-weighted average difference between acquirer and target country total factor 
productivity (Penn World Table) is positive, and zero otherwise.  
TARIFFS Average tariffs (MFN duty rate applied) by country and industry (two-digit SIC level), as a percentage of sales price (World Trade Organization UNCTAD 
TRAINS). 
IMP Import penetration, defined as imports (United Nations COMTRADE) over sales in a country-industry (two-digit SIC level). 
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Summary statistics: Investor protection and market concentration by target country 
This table shows number of observations, number of firms, mean, and standard deviation of the difference in 
investor protection between acquirer and target countries (IP) and Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI). The sample 
consists of FactSet firms for which GOV data are available in the 2005-2014 period. Variable definitions are 
provided in Table A2 in the Appendix. 










Argentina 30 8 0.067 0.254 0.100 0.097 
Australia 1,975 333 0.198 0.399 0.118 0.115 
Austria 47 16 0.213 0.414 0.074 0.036 
Belgium 75 23 0.307 0.464 0.061 0.042 
Bermuda 50 21 0.000 0.000 0.158 0.058 
Brazil 526 127 0.000 0.000 0.085 0.115 
Canada 1,584 284 0.074 0.263 0.118 0.082 
Chile 30 12 0.000 0.000 0.105 0.175 
China 6,052 1,115 0.537 0.499 0.107 0.102 
Colombia 23 10 0.087 0.288 0.054 0.064 
Denmark 112 29 0.045 0.207 0.071 0.052 
Finland 76 40 0.039 0.196 0.070 0.038 
France 660 114 0.267 0.443 0.079 0.057 
Germany 138 42 0.159 0.367 0.070 0.049 
Greece 30 16 0.067 0.254 0.100 0.073 
Hong Kong 711 157 0.000 0.000 0.077 0.060 
India 3,597 765 0.000 0.000 0.083 0.066 
Indonesia 167 57 0.120 0.326 0.117 0.079 
Israel 74 20 0.054 0.228 0.056 0.032 
Italy 279 59 0.423 0.495 0.074 0.071 
Japan 10,453 1,926 0.077 0.267 0.094 0.076 
Luxembourg 30 11 0.467 0.507 0.074 0.019 
Malaysia 273 67 0.000 0.000 0.120 0.119 
Mexico 125 39 0.224 0.419 0.115 0.078 
Netherlands 222 55 0.482 0.501 0.079 0.060 
New Zealand 71 25 0.070 0.258 0.082 0.061 
Norway 154 41 0.221 0.416 0.132 0.161 
Pakistan 23 13 0.652 0.487 0.082 0.094 
Peru 13 6 0.231 0.439 0.148 0.071 
Philippines 121 37 0.041 0.200 0.096 0.065 
Poland 36 11 0.333 0.478 0.068 0.041 
Portugal 39 10 0.282 0.456 0.085 0.093 
Russian Federation 137 45 0.051 0.221 0.101 0.085 
Singapore 325 67 0.000 0.000 0.082 0.072 
South Africa 405 93 0.000 0.000 0.107 0.099 
South Korea 175 35 0.051 0.222 0.077 0.040 
Spain 214 48 0.000 0.000 0.082 0.079 
Sweden 354 73 0.212 0.409 0.081 0.043 
Switzerland 156 39 0.269 0.445 0.062 0.033 
Taiwan 1,161 307 0.320 0.467 0.078 0.030 
Thailand 106 35 0.066 0.250 0.097 0.083 
Turkey 100 37 0.040 0.197 0.113 0.078 
United Kingdom 2,477 370 0.000 0.000 0.101 0.115 
United Arab Emirates 26 12 0.000 0.000 0.102 0.055 
Other 66 41 




Summary statistics: Market concentration by target industry 
This table shows number of observations, number of firms, mean, and standard deviation of the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (HHI) based on the market share of U.S. sales by industry. The sample consists of FactSet firms 
for which GOV data are available in the 2005-2014 period. The number of firms is the average number of firms used 








Agricultural production, crops 122 28 0.364 0.036 
Agricultural production, livestock 43 13 0.526 0.076 
Agricultural services 37 11 0.533 0.086 
Forestry 12 3 0.926 0.027 
Fishing, hunting, & trapping 10 5 0.938 0.102 
Metal, mining 987 185 0.240 0.023 
Coal mining 276 58 0.091 0.012 
Oil & gas extraction 919 173 0.125 0.048 
Nonmetallic minerals, except fuels 48 20 0.305 0.065 
General building contractors 526 111 0.079 0.003 
Heavy construction, except building 444 95 0.262 0.072 
Special trade contractors 114 28 0.188 0.013 
Food & kindred products 1,543 299 0.078 0.018 
Tobacco products 8 5 0.384 0.069 
Textile mill products 278 66 0.281 0.030 
Apparel & other textile products 305 62 0.113 0.012 
Lumber & wood products 56 15 0.125 0.014 
Furniture & fixtures 35 14 0.458 0.044 
Paper & allied products 448 113 0.092 0.007 
Printing & publishing 373 69 0.061 0.008 
Chemical & allied products 3,838 691 0.039 0.002 
Petroleum & coal products 64 29 0.274 0.061 
Rubber & miscellaneous plastics products 331 76 0.194 0.017 
Leather & leather products 10 6 0.253 0.029 
Stone, clay, & glass products 790 155 0.208 0.017 
Primary metal industries 1,234 260 0.062 0.003 
Fabricated metal products 544 112 0.065 0.002 
Industrial machinery & equipment 2,194 396 0.074 0.005 
Electronic & other electric equipment 2,485 455 0.088 0.009 
Transportation equipment 1,144 197 0.120 0.015 
Instruments & related products 781 147 0.043 0.004 
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 184 39 0.113 0.007 
Railroad transportation 17 5 0.204 0.013 
Local & interurban passenger transit 95 33 0.779 0.228 
Trucking & warehousing 181 36 0.230 0.020 
Water transportation 329 85 0.194 0.005 
Transportation by Air 151 53 0.094 0.013 
Pipelines, except natural gas 10 3 0.227 0.024 
Transportation services 262 61 0.137 0.011 
Communications 912 188 0.087 0.008 
Electric, gas, & sanitary services 1,569 287 0.010 0.002 
Wholesale trade, durable goods 791 150 0.051 0.002 
Wholesale trade, nondurable goods 464 98 0.103 0.005 
Building materials & gardening supplies 11 3 0.476 0.014 
General merchandise stores 235 52 0.353 0.015 
Food stores 360 73 0.160 0.013 
Automotive dealers & service stations 67 17 0.088 0.010 
Apparel & accessory stores 163 33 0.066 0.003 




Continued     








Eating & drinking places 312 61 0.080 0.010 
Miscellaneous retail 367 77 0.122 0.012 
Depository institutions 31 8 0.112 0.006 
Nondepository institutions 195 42 0.124 0.030 
Security & commodity brokers 485 106 0.089 0.015 
Insurance carriers 12 3 0.043 0.005 
Insurance agents, brokers, & service 20 4 0.274 0.106 
Real estate 1,212 248 0.096 0.015 
Holding & other investment offices 1,159 228 0.018 0.003 
Hotels & other lodging places 215 44 0.077 0.010 
Personal services 42 13 0.133 0.004 
Business services 2,129 431 0.043 0.016 
Auto repair, services, & parking 44 9 0.210 0.033 
Miscellaneous repair services 4 2 0.413 0.108 
Motion pictures 73 22 0.216 0.024 
Amusement & recreation services 179 41 0.081 0.010 
Health services 150 35 0.068 0.009 
Legal services 6 2 0.815 0.203 
Educational services 78 18 0.239 0.035 
Social services 8 4 0.269 0.001 
Engineering & management services 860 156 0.066 0.008 
Services, not elsewhere classified 4 1 0.858 0.248 






Cross-border M&As and non-target corporate governance: Placebo	
This table presents estimates of firm fixed effects panel regressions of the corporate governance index (GOV) on the 
value of cross-border M&As in a target firm’s country-industry as a fraction of market capitalization (XVAL). The 
table presents average coefficient estimates using 1,000 randomizations to calculate XVAL and IP. IP (dummy 
variable) is the difference in investor protection between acquirer country and target country in a given target firm’s 
country-industry. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of market shares based on U.S. sales in a given industry. 
Regressions include the same control variables as in Table 4 (coefficients not shown) and year fixed effects. All 
explanatory variables are lagged one year. The sample consists of FactSet firms, including U.S. firms, for which 
GOV data are available in the 2005-2014 period. Variable definitions are provided in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
Robust p-values adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in brackets. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
XVAL 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
(0.985) (0.974) (0.986) (0.939) 
IP 0.000 0.000 
(0.970) (0.960) 
XVAL × IP 0.000 -0.003 
(0.992) (0.950) 
HHI 0.030 0.031 
(0.235) (0.234) 
XVAL × HHI 0.005 -0.003 
(0.982) (0.974) 
IP × HHI 0.000 
(0.985) 
XVAL × IP × HHI 0.029 
(0.901) 
Number of observations 33,498 33,498 33,498 33,498 






Cross-border M&As and non-target corporate governance: Sample with U.S. firms 
This table presents estimates of firm fixed effects panel regressions of the corporate governance index (GOV) on the 
value of cross-border M&As in a target firm’s country-industry as a fraction of market capitalization (XVAL). IP 
(dummy variable) is the difference in investor protection between acquirer country and target country in a given 
target firm’s country-industry. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of market shares based on U.S. sales in a 
given industry. Regressions include year fixed effects. All explanatory variables are lagged one year. The sample 
consists of FactSet firms, including U.S. firms, for which GOV data are available in the 2005-2014 period. Variable 
definitions are provided in Table A2 in the Appendix. Robust p-values adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported 
in brackets. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
XVAL 0.0004 -0.0195 0.0136 -0.0212 
(0.974) (0.180) (0.436) (0.265) 
IP 0.0009 -0.0000 
(0.320) (0.990) 
XVAL  IP 0.0620** 0.1162*** 
(0.019) (0.003) 
HHI 0.0270 0.0239 
(0.108) (0.156) 
XVAL  HHI -0.1154 0.0144 
(0.260) (0.880) 
IP  HHI 0.0090 
(0.521) 
XVAL  IP  HHI -0.5499* 
(0.063) 
DVAL -0.0101 -0.0103 -0.0103 -0.0098 
(0.262) (0.257) (0.254) (0.281) 
ASSETS (log) -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0003 
(0.821) (0.821) (0.791) (0.853) (0.828) 
LEVERAGE -0.0045 -0.0045 -0.0049 -0.0043 -0.0048 
(0.441) (0.444) (0.404) (0.464) (0.413) 
CASH -0.0039 -0.0039 -0.0041 -0.0039 -0.0041 
(0.502) (0.503) (0.483) (0.498) (0.476) 
CAPEX 0.0255** 0.0255** 0.0250** 0.0254** 0.0251** 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) 
PPE 0.0015 0.0015 0.0020 0.0017 0.0021 
(0.806) (0.809) (0.753) (0.788) (0.733) 
ROA 0.0141** 0.0141** 0.0142** 0.0141** 0.0144** 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) 
MB -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 
(0.180) (0.177) (0.195) (0.164) (0.180) 
SGROWTH -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0015 -0.0014 -0.0015 
(0.249) (0.249) (0.232) (0.243) (0.228) 
R&D 0.0777*** 0.0778*** 0.0771*** 0.0777*** 0.0772*** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
FXSALES -0.0053 -0.0053 -0.0047 -0.0053 -0.0047 
(0.270) (0.269) (0.334) (0.269) (0.331) 
ANALYST -0.0010*** -0.0010*** -0.0010*** -0.0010*** -0.0010*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ADR 0.0236** 0.0236** 0.0244** 0.0237** 0.0245** 
(0.026) (0.025) (0.021) (0.025) (0.020) 
CLOSE -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0017 -0.0020 -0.0019 
(0.449) (0.451) (0.504) (0.424) (0.457) 
IO_TOTAL 0.0442*** 0.0442*** 0.0440*** 0.0444*** 0.0441*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of observations 48,531 48,531 48,258 48,531 48,258 
Number of firms 9,612 9,612 9,552 9,612 9,552 
R-squared 0.115 0.115 0.115 0.116 0.115 
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Table IA.5  
Cross-border M&As and non-target corporate governance: Ownership by foreign investors 
This table presents estimates of firm fixed effects panel regressions of the corporate governance index (GOV) on the 
value of cross-border M&As in a target firm’s country-industry as a fraction of market capitalization (XVAL). IP 
(dummy variable) is the difference in investor protection between acquirer country and target country in a given 
target firm’s country-industry. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of market shares based on U.S. sales in a 
given industry. Regressions include year fixed effects. All explanatory variables are lagged one year. The sample 
consists of FactSet firms for which GOV data are available in the 2005-2014 period. Variable definitions are 
provided in Table A2 in the Appendix. Robust p-values adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in brackets. *, 
**, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
XVAL 0.0036 -0.0159 0.0327 -0.0008 
(0.798) (0.292) (0.106) (0.969) 
IP 0.0002 -0.0017 
(0.863) (0.453) 
XVAL  IP 0.0831** 0.1614*** 
(0.013) (0.001) 
HHI 0.0399* 0.0373* 
(0.056) (0.070) 
XVAL  HHI -0.2579** -0.1248 
(0.043) (0.247) 
IP  HHI 0.0243 
(0.347) 
XVAL  IP  HHI -0.9972** 
(0.028) 
DVAL -0.0355*** -0.0339*** -0.0361*** -0.0338*** 
(0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) 
ASSETS (log) -0.0020 -0.0021 -0.0021 -0.0019 -0.0019 
(0.346) (0.339) (0.330) (0.369) (0.377) 
LEVERAGE -0.0070 -0.0070 -0.0073 -0.0066 -0.0072 
(0.395) (0.399) (0.381) (0.422) (0.388) 
CASH -0.0094 -0.0094 -0.0096 -0.0096 -0.0099 
(0.252) (0.248) (0.238) (0.241) (0.228) 
CAPEX 0.0071 0.0068 0.0053 0.0065 0.0054 
(0.609) (0.626) (0.699) (0.639) (0.695) 
PPE -0.0047 -0.0048 -0.0038 -0.0046 -0.0036 
(0.617) (0.608) (0.684) (0.630) (0.705) 
ROA 0.0294*** 0.0292*** 0.0305*** 0.0296*** 0.0315*** 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) 
MB -0.0005* -0.0005* -0.0005* -0.0006** -0.0005** 
(0.054) (0.050) (0.063) (0.040) (0.049) 
SGROWTH -0.0020 -0.0019 -0.0021 -0.0020 -0.0022 
(0.240) (0.254) (0.209) (0.243) (0.191) 
R&D 0.1906*** 0.1909*** 0.1896*** 0.1904*** 0.1893*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
FXSALES -0.0040 -0.0041 -0.0034 -0.0040 -0.0034 
(0.490) (0.482) (0.559) (0.491) (0.564) 
ANALYST -0.0009*** -0.0009*** -0.0009*** -0.0009*** -0.0009*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ADR 0.0176 0.0178 0.0186* 0.0178 0.0186* 
(0.117) (0.113) (0.097) (0.111) (0.098) 
CLOSE 0.0018 0.0017 0.0021 0.0016 0.0017 
(0.639) (0.652) (0.583) (0.677) (0.648) 
IO_FOR 0.0468*** 0.0469*** 0.0455*** 0.0472*** 0.0457*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) 
Number of observations 29,993 29,993 29,841 29,993 29,841 
Number of firms 6,116 6,116 6,108 6,116 6,108 




Cross-border M&As and non-target corporate governance: Ownership by activist investors 
This table presents estimates of firm fixed effects panel regressions of the corporate governance index (GOV) on the 
value of cross-border M&As in a target firm’s country-industry as a fraction of market capitalization (XVAL). IP 
(dummy variable) is the difference in investor protection between acquirer country and target country in a given 
target firm’s country-industry. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of market shares based on U.S. sales in a 
given industry. Regressions include year fixed effects. All explanatory variables are lagged one year. The sample 
consists of FactSet firms for which GOV data are available in the 2005-2014 period. Variable definitions are 
provided in Table A2 in the Appendix. Robust p-values adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in brackets. *, 
**, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
XVAL 0.0024 -0.0173 0.0311 -0.0029 
(0.865) (0.252) (0.125) (0.888) 
IP 0.0002 -0.0017 
(0.895) (0.445) 
XVAL  IP 0.0844** 0.1634*** 
(0.012) (0.001) 
HHI 0.0393* 0.0368* 
(0.060) (0.076) 
XVAL  HHI -0.2542** -0.1197 
(0.047) (0.267) 
IP  HHI 0.0240 
(0.353) 
XVAL  IP  HHI -1.0028** 
(0.028) 
DVAL -0.0353*** -0.0337*** -0.0359*** -0.0335*** 
(0.005) (0.009) (0.004) (0.008) 
ASSETS (log) -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0015 -0.0013 -0.0013 
(0.510) (0.501) (0.485) (0.539) (0.544) 
LEVERAGE -0.0084 -0.0084 -0.0086 -0.0080 -0.0085 
(0.309) (0.313) (0.301) (0.332) (0.306) 
CASH -0.0089 -0.0090 -0.0092 -0.0091 -0.0094 
(0.276) (0.272) (0.261) (0.264) (0.250) 
CAPEX 0.0080 0.0077 0.0062 0.0075 0.0063 
(0.561) (0.576) (0.651) (0.589) (0.647) 
PPE -0.0046 -0.0048 -0.0038 -0.0045 -0.0035 
(0.624) (0.614) (0.690) (0.635) (0.711) 
ROA 0.0308*** 0.0307*** 0.0320*** 0.0311*** 0.0329*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) 
MB -0.0005* -0.0005* -0.0004* -0.0005* -0.0005* 
(0.086) (0.080) (0.098) (0.066) (0.079) 
SGROWTH -0.0021 -0.0021 -0.0023 -0.0021 -0.0023 
(0.207) (0.218) (0.178) (0.209) (0.162) 
R&D 0.1833*** 0.1836*** 0.1826*** 0.1830*** 0.1822*** 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
FXSALES -0.0037 -0.0038 -0.0032 -0.0037 -0.0031 
(0.525) (0.517) (0.594) (0.526) (0.600) 
ANALYST -0.0008*** -0.0008*** -0.0008*** -0.0009*** -0.0008*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ADR 0.0180 0.0181 0.0190* 0.0182 0.0190* 
(0.115) (0.111) (0.095) (0.109) (0.096) 
CLOSE 0.0011 0.0011 0.0015 0.0009 0.0011 
(0.763) (0.778) (0.699) (0.805) (0.768) 
IO_ACT 0.0031 0.0053 0.0027 0.0051 0.0025 
(0.954) (0.920) (0.960) (0.922) (0.963) 
Number of observations 29,993 29,993 29,841 29,993 29,841 
Number of firms 6,116 6,116 6,108 6,116 6,108 




Cross-border M&As and non-target corporate governance: Country-year fixed effects 
This table presents estimates of firm fixed effects panel regressions of the corporate governance index (GOV) on the 
value of cross-border M&As in a target firm’s country-industry as a fraction of market capitalization (XVAL). IP 
(dummy variable) is the difference in investor protection between acquirer country and target country in a given 
target firm’s country-industry. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of market shares based on U.S. sales in a 
given industry. Regressions include country-year fixed effects. All explanatory variables are lagged one year. The 
sample consists of FactSet firms for which GOV data are available in the 2005-2014 period. Variable definitions are 
provided in Table A2 in the Appendix. Robust p-values adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in brackets. *, 
**, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
XVAL 0.0029 -0.0062 0.0150 -0.0079 
(0.826) (0.656) (0.404) (0.669) 
IP -0.0008 -0.0009 
(0.458) (0.638) 
XVAL  IP 0.0427 0.1290*** 
(0.193) (0.008) 
HHI -0.0048 -0.0041 
(0.785) (0.816) 
XVAL  HHI -0.1025 0.0111 
(0.319) (0.908) 
IP  HHI 0.0022 
(0.916) 
XVAL  IP  HHI -0.9822** 
(0.016) 
DVAL  -0.0198 -0.0193 -0.0202 -0.0192 
 (0.108) (0.118) (0.101) (0.118) 
ASSETS (log) 0.0052*** 0.0052*** 0.0052*** 0.0052*** 0.0052*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
LEVERAGE -0.0063 -0.0063 -0.0063 -0.0063 -0.0065 
(0.338) (0.339) (0.340) (0.334) (0.326) 
CASH -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0008 
(0.907) (0.901) (0.901) (0.899) (0.902) 
CAPEX -0.0034 -0.0036 -0.0037 -0.0037 -0.0034 
(0.753) (0.743) (0.736) (0.735) (0.751) 
PPE 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 
(0.968) (0.972) (0.965) (0.975) (0.960) 
ROA 0.0106 0.0106 0.0106 0.0107 0.0112 
(0.259) (0.262) (0.259) (0.257) (0.235) 
MB -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 
(0.422) (0.416) (0.424) (0.425) (0.440) 
SGROWTH -0.0023 -0.0023 -0.0022 -0.0022 -0.0022 
(0.117) (0.121) (0.124) (0.123) (0.126) 
R&D 0.0994** 0.0997** 0.0998** 0.0998** 0.1000** 
(0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
FXSALES 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 
(0.944) (0.950) (0.946) (0.953) (0.954) 
ANALYST 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
(0.735) (0.739) (0.738) (0.746) (0.749) 
ADR -0.0015 -0.0016 -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0018 
(0.829) (0.826) (0.826) (0.827) (0.801) 
CLOSE -0.0054* -0.0054* -0.0054* -0.0054* -0.0056* 
(0.075) (0.073) (0.074) (0.073) (0.063) 
IO_TOTAL 0.0192** 0.0194** 0.0193** 0.0192** 0.0189** 
(0.029) (0.027) (0.028) (0.029) (0.031) 
Number of observations 33,498 33,498 33,498 33,498 33,498 
Number of firms 6,691 6,691 6,691 6,691 6,691 




Cross-border M&As and non-target corporate governance: Country-level clustering 
This table presents estimates of firm fixed effects panel regressions of the corporate governance index (GOV) on the 
value of cross-border M&As in a target firm’s country-industry as a fraction of market capitalization (XVAL). IP 
(dummy variable) is the difference in investor protection between acquirer country and target country in a given 
target firm’s country-industry. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of market shares based on U.S. sales in a 
given industry. Regressions include year fixed effects. All explanatory variables are lagged one year. The sample 
consists of FactSet firms for which GOV data are available in the 2005-2014 period. Variable definitions are 
provided in Table A2 in the Appendix. Robust p-values adjusted for country-level clustering are reported in 
brackets. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
XVAL 0.0021 -0.0189 0.0169 -0.0202 
(0.934) (0.509) (0.558) (0.602) 
IP 0.0009 0.0008 
(0.634) (0.808) 
XVAL  IP 0.0857*** 0.1672*** 
(0.009) (0.001) 
HHI 0.0416 0.0415 
(0.115) (0.120) 
XVAL  HHI -0.1295** 0.0093 
(0.034) (0.944) 
IP  HHI 0.0008 
(0.978) 
XVAL  IP  HHI -0.9585*** 
(0.000) 
DVAL -0.0329** -0.0320* -0.0333** -0.0316* 
(0.041) (0.053) (0.039) (0.058) 
ASSETS (log) 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0010 0.0010 
(0.925) (0.927) (0.925) (0.918) (0.913) 
LEVERAGE -0.0084 -0.0084 -0.0084 -0.0081 -0.0082 
(0.102) (0.104) (0.105) (0.114) (0.115) 
CASH -0.0088 -0.0088 -0.0089 -0.0089 -0.0089 
(0.645) (0.642) (0.642) (0.642) (0.641) 
CAPEX 0.0198 0.0195 0.0197 0.0194 0.0199 
(0.351) (0.360) (0.354) (0.362) (0.347) 
PPE -0.0031 -0.0031 -0.0031 -0.0029 -0.0029 
(0.818) (0.816) (0.818) (0.829) (0.832) 
ROA 0.0277* 0.0275* 0.0276* 0.0277* 0.0282* 
(0.068) (0.067) (0.069) (0.066) (0.060) 
MB -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 
(0.137) (0.133) (0.141) (0.125) (0.131) 
SGROWTH -0.0015 -0.0014 -0.0013 -0.0015 -0.0014 
(0.572) (0.582) (0.598) (0.569) (0.583) 
R&D 0.2038* 0.2043* 0.2031 0.2037* 0.2021* 
(0.100) (0.100) (0.101) (0.099) (0.099) 
FXSALES -0.0026 -0.0027 -0.0028 -0.0027 -0.0028 
(0.758) (0.748) (0.743) (0.754) (0.746) 
ANALYST -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0009 
(0.127) (0.124) (0.125) (0.124) (0.124) 
ADR 0.0169 0.0171 0.0170 0.0171 0.0168 
(0.346) (0.339) (0.340) (0.340) (0.348) 
CLOSE 0.0057 0.0057 0.0057 0.0055 0.0053 
(0.583) (0.581) (0.581) (0.591) (0.607) 
IO_TOTAL 0.0581** 0.0585** 0.0583** 0.0590** 0.0586** 
(0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.025) (0.026) 
Number of observations 33,498 33,498 33,498 33,498 33,498 
Number of firms 6,691 6,691 6,691 6,691 6,691 




Cross-border M&As and non-target corporate governance: Leads and lags 
This table presents estimates of firm fixed effects panel regressions of the corporate governance index (GOV) on the 
value of cross-border M&As in a target firm’s country-industry as a fraction of market capitalization (XVAL). IP 
(dummy variable) is the difference in investor protection between acquirer country and target country in a given 
target firm’s country-industry. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of market shares based on U.S. sales in a 
given industry. Regressions include the same control variables as in Table 4 (coefficients not shown) and year fixed 
effects. The sample consists of FactSet firms for which GOV data are available in the 2005-2014 period. Variable 
definitions are provided in Table A2 in the Appendix. Robust p-values adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported 
in brackets. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
XVAL(t+1) -0.0067 -0.0264 0.0066 -0.0268 
(0.696) (0.129) (0.775) (0.231) 
IP(t+1) -0.0019 0.0022 
(0.177) (0.347) 
XVAL(t+1)  IP(t+1) 0.0978* 0.1474** 
(0.052) (0.036) 
HHI(t+1) -0.0464* -0.0398 
(0.061) (0.143) 
XVAL(t+1)  HHI(t+1) -0.1127 0.0080 
(0.240) (0.931) 
IP(t+1)  HHI(t+1) -0.0469** 
(0.036) 
XVAL(t+1)  IP(t+1)  HHI(t+1) -0.5234 
(0.288) 
XVAL(t) -0.0096 -0.0223 0.0082 -0.0186 
(0.569) (0.205) (0.729) (0.420) 
IP(t) 0.0002 0.0023 
(0.890) (0.320) 
XVAL(t)  IP(t) 0.0573 0.1303** 
(0.234) (0.041) 
HHI(t) -0.0257 -0.0248 
(0.299) (0.334) 
XVAL(t)  HHI(t) -0.1620 -0.0311 
(0.240) (0.790) 
IP(t)  HHI(t) -0.0243 
(0.252) 
XVAL(t)  IP(t)  HHI(t) -0.8175** 
(0.015) 
XVAL(t-1) -0.0028 -0.0272 0.0173 -0.0239 
(0.859) (0.102) (0.460) (0.298) 
IP(t-1) -0.0010 -0.0014 
(0.454) (0.540) 
XVAL(t-1)  IP(t-1) 0.1157*** 0.1942*** 
(0.005) (0.005) 
HHI(t-1) 0.0878*** 0.0869*** 
(0.001) (0.001) 
XVAL(t-1)  HHI(t-1) -0.1737 -0.0152 
(0.265) (0.910) 
IP(t-1)  HHI(t-1) 0.0092 
(0.697) 
XVAL(t-1)  IP(t-1)  HHI(t-1) -0.9513 
(0.112) 
Number of observations 24,917 24,917 24,917 24,917 
Number of firms 5,638 5,638 5,638 5,638 
R-squared 0.080 0.081 0.081 0.083 
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Table IA.10  
Cross-border M&As and non-target corporate governance: Diversifying versus non-diversifying deals 
This table presents estimates of firm fixed effects panel regressions of the corporate governance index (GOV) on the value of cross-border M&As in a target 
firm’s country-industry as a fraction of market capitalization (XVAL). In Columns (1)-(4), XVAL is calculated using diversifying deals (i.e., acquirer firm and 
target firm have different two-digit SIC codes). In Columns (5)-(8), XVAL is calculated using non-diversifying deals (i.e., acquirer firm and target firm have the 
same two-digit SIC code). IP (dummy variable) is the difference in investor protection between acquirer country and target country in a given target firm’s 
country-industry. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of market shares based on U.S. sales in a given industry. Regressions include the same control 
variables as in Table 4 (coefficients not shown) and year fixed effects. All explanatory variables are lagged one year. The sample consists of FactSet firms for 
which GOV data are available in the 2005-2014 period. Variable definitions are provided in Table A2 in the Appendix. Robust p-values adjusted for firm-level 
clustering are reported in brackets. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Diversifying deals  Non-diversifying deals 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
XVAL -0.0228 -0.0445 -0.0330 -0.1070***  0.0046 -0.0111 0.0515* 0.0279 
(0.424) (0.138) (0.442) (0.007)  (0.842) (0.664) (0.098) (0.411) 
IP 0.0019* -0.0008  0.0021 0.0035 
(0.094) (0.685)  (0.106) (0.105) 
XVAL  IP 0.1016 0.4216***  0.0715 0.0885 
(0.140) (0.000)  (0.187) (0.232) 
HHI 0.0410** 0.0403**  0.0437** 0.0430** 
(0.033) (0.036)  (0.023) (0.025) 
XVAL  HHI 0.0905 0.5813**  -0.4495** -0.3616 
(0.787) (0.014)  (0.031) (0.103) 
IP  HHI 0.0377  -0.0164 
(0.109)  (0.410) 
XVAL  IP  HHI -3.6972***  -0.2794 
(0.000)  (0.534) 
Number of observations 33,498 33,498 33,498 33,498  33,498 33,498 33,498 33,498 
Number of firms 6,691 6,691 6,691 6,691  6,691 6,691 6,691 6,691 






Cross-border M&As and non-target corporate governance: Alternative measures of investor protection 
This table presents estimates of firm fixed effects panel regressions of the corporate governance index (GOV) on the 
value of cross-border M&As in a target firm’s country-industry as a fraction of market capitalization (XVAL). IP 
(dummy variable) is the difference in investor protection between acquirer country and target country in a given 
target firm’s country-industry. Investor protection is proxied by the anti-self dealing index (Djankov, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008) in Column (1), the ex-ante anti-self dealing index in Column (2), and the ex-
post anti-self dealing index in Column (3). Regressions include year fixed effects and the same controls used in 
Table 4. All explanatory variables are lagged one year. Robust p-values adjusted for firm-level clustering are 








(1) (2) (3) 
XVAL -0.0022 -0.0158 -0.0343 
(0.902) (0.350) (0.132) 
IP -0.0042*** -0.0025** 0.0013 
(0.000) (0.027) (0.132) 
XVAL  IP 0.0286 0.0638** 0.0508* 
(0.273) (0.020) (0.070) 
DVAL -0.0370*** -0.0364*** -0.0376*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
ASSETS (log) -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 
(0.890) (0.926) (0.948) 
LEVERAGE -0.0148** -0.0149** -0.0152** 
(0.033) (0.032) (0.029) 
CASH -0.0163** -0.0163** -0.0163** 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
CAPEX 0.0110 0.0105 0.0111 
(0.317) (0.341) (0.316) 
PPE -0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0005 
(0.902) (0.930) (0.942) 
ROA 0.0033 0.0033 0.0032 
(0.278) (0.279) (0.292) 
MB 0.0227** 0.0225** 0.0221** 
(0.017) (0.019) (0.021) 
SGROWTH -0.0004* -0.0004* -0.0004* 
(0.069) (0.066) (0.065) 
R&D 0.1712*** 0.1729*** 0.1701*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
FXSALES -0.0014 -0.0016 -0.0018 
(0.781) (0.757) (0.730) 
ANALYST -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 
(0.737) (0.736) (0.720) 
ADR -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CLOSE 0.0168 0.0166 0.0170 
(0.135) (0.137) (0.127) 
IO_TOTAL 0.0637*** 0.0630*** 0.0633*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of observations 33,498 33,498 33,498 
Number of firms 6,691 6,691 6,691 






Effect of non-target corporate governance on cross-border M&As  
This table presents estimates of firm fixed effects panel regressions of the value of cross-border M&As in a target 
firm’s country-industry as a fraction of market capitalization (XVAL) on corporate governance index (GOV). 
Column (1) presents estimates at the firm level, and Column (2) present estimates at the county-industry level. 
Regressions include the same control variables as in Table 4 (coefficients not shown) and year fixed effects. All 
explanatory variables are lagged one year. The sample consists of FactSet firms for which GOV data are available in 
the 2005-2014 period. Variable definitions are provided in Table A2 in the Appendix. Robust p-values adjusted for 
country-level clustering are reported in brackets. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
(1) (2) 
GOV -0.0061 0.0129 
(0.126) (0.600) 
Number of observations 26,332 2,921 
Number of firms 6,046 629 






Cross-border M&As and non-target corporate governance: Instrumental variables with sample with acquirer 
investor protection greater than target investor protection 
This table presents estimates of instrumental variable estimates of firm fixed effects panel regressions of corporate 
governance index (GOV), investment rate (INV) and Tobin’s Q (TOBIN_Q) on the value of cross-border M&As in a 
target firm’s country-industry as a fraction of market capitalization (XVAL). XVAL is calculated using cross-border 
deals in which the acquirer country investor protection is greater than the target country investor protection. The 
sample consists of FactSet firms for which GOV data are available in the 2005-2014 period. Regressions include 
year fixed effects. All explanatory variables are lagged one year. Variable definitions are provided in Table A2 in 
the Appendix. Robust p-values adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in brackets. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 First stage Second stage 
 XVAL GOV INV TOBIN_Q 
(1) (2) (4) (3) 
XVAL 3.6485*** 2.2482* 0.3816 
(0.009) (0.051) (0.927) 
TARIFFS -0.0407**  
(0.044)  
IMP -0.0033  
(0.164)  
US_DVALC -0.0088  
(0.746)  
DVAL 0.0059 -0.064 0.0056 0.2121 
(0.905) (0.766) (0.964) (0.349) 
ASSETS (log) 0.0008 0.0066 -0.0290*** -0.2783*** 
(0.717) (0.398) (0.000) 0.000 
LEVERAGE 0.0009 -0.0117 -0.0641** 0.0088 
(0.915) (0.708) (0.013) (0.915) 
CASH 0.0036 -0.0245 0.0232 0.003 
(0.684) (0.465) (0.404) (0.977) 
CAPEX 0.0024 -0.0016 0.0555 
(0.864) (0.974) (0.655) 
PPE -0.0072 0.0409 -0.1579*** 0.0411 
(0.429) (0.230) (0.000) (0.686) 
ROA -0.0071 0.0412 0.0940** 0.7556*** 
(0.541) (0.403) (0.015) 0.000 
MB -0.0005** 0.0015 0.0021**  
(0.020) (0.190) (0.022)  
SGROWTH -0.0016 0.0108 0.0105 0.0300* 
(0.508) (0.225) (0.108) (0.065) 
R&D -0.0136 0.2109 0.2107 0.0262 
(0.773) (0.257) (0.119) (0.960) 
FXSALES -0.0009 -0.0124 -0.0286* -0.1060** 
(0.862) (0.547) (0.080) (0.036) 
ANALYST -0.0007** 0.001 0.0025** -0.0021 
(0.031) (0.493) (0.025) (0.604) 
ADR 0.0199 -0.0477 -0.0278 0.1014 
(0.526) (0.610) (0.731) (0.393) 
CLOSE 0.0017 0.0061 0.0145 0.0492 
(0.696) (0.704) (0.236) (0.195) 
IO_TOTAL 0.0152 -0.0427 0.0078 0.1874* 
(0.114) (0.310) (0.813) (0.058) 
Sanderson-Windmeijer F-statistic 3.49  
[p-value] [0.015]  
Number of observations 4,664 4,664 4,656 4,658 





Corporate governance and valuation 
This table presents estimates of firm fixed effects panel regressions of the logarithm of Tobin’s Q (TOBIN_Q) on the 
the corporate governance index (GOV_RES) orthogonalized with respect to the covariates used in the baseline 
regression in Column (3) of Table 4. Regression includes the same control variables as in Table 4 (coefficients not 
shown) and year fixed effects. All explanatory variables are lagged one year. The sample consists of FactSet firms 
for which corporate governance index (GOV) data are available in the 2005-2014 period. Variable definitions are 
provided in Table A2 in the Appendix. Robust p-values adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in brackets. *, 




Number of observations 26,075 
Number of firms 5,982 
R-squared 0.202 
 
 
